“Politics as Markets” Reconsidered: Economic Theory, Competitive
Democracy and Primary Ballot Access
by David Schleicher1

Over the past decade, mainstream election law scholarship has been based largely
on a simple but forceful set of analogies: politics are like markets, parties are like
competing firms and voters are like consumers that decide at election-time what type of
public policies they would like to buy.2 This theory has been criticized for taking the
analogy between markets too far and for relying too heavily on one method – electoral
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competition – as the solution for all political problems.3 The true problems of the
“politics as markets” theory, though, lie at the inverse of these criticisms. Our
understanding of markets can explain a great deal about electoral behavior, but scholars
working in this vein have failed to consistently apply the lessons of economic theory,
particularly a branch known as natural monopoly theory, to their studies of election law.
Moreover, competition is not too narrow a concept on which to base the regulation of
elections, but rather is too broad. There are a number of conflicting normative
justifications for using competition as a guide for electoral regulation, each of which
suggest different policy outcomes. While the Supreme Court has not made itself clear on
this score, it has created a constitutional election law jurisprudence that does not suffer
from these flaws. Its holdings in the area of ballot access law, much pilloried by “politics
as markets” scholars, are in fact consistent with the application of economic theory to
electoral markets and feature a balanced approach to the conflicting normative
justifications for favoring competition. This paper stands as a defense of the Court’s
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approach from the viewpoints of both economic theory and competitive democratic
theory.
I.

Introduction: Primary Ballot Access Laws and Optimal Regulation
Political party primaries were not introduced into the American political scene

until the 1880s,4 and, as such, it is not surprising that the Constitution does not require
political parties to hold primaries to select their standard bearers for the general election.5
The Constitution leaves regulation of elections to the states,6 and although states are by
no means obligated to force political parties to use primary elections as a way to select
their candidates, the Supreme Court made clear that it is “too plain for argument…that
the State … may insist that intraparty competition be settled before the general election
by primary election.”7 What is less clear is the extent to which a state can do more than
just require a primary, but decide the rules by which it will be run.
The wide range of efforts by states to regulate primaries can be roughly divided
into two general categories. The first set involves attempts by the state to either limit or
4

See Adam Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’s Wrongs: Early Political party Regulation in the State

Courts, 1886-1915, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 876 (2000) (“Between 1882 and World War I, state
legislatures across the country adopted "Australian" (i.e., state-printed, secret) ballot and party primary
laws to regulate general elections, party nominating procedures, and the internal governance structure of
parties.”)
5

The Twenty-Fourth Amendment does make reference to party primaries, but only states that, if held, they

may not feature poll taxes. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote
in any primary or other election … shall not be denied or abridged … by reason of failure to pay any poll
tax or other tax.”).
6

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.

7

American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (emphasis mine).

3

extend who can be a member of a political party – against the wishes of that party -- for
the purposes of voting or running for election in primaries. The second category involves
attempts by undisputed members of the political parties to overcome state or party rules
to get onto primary ballots.
The Supreme Court settled many of the questions about the first type of case in
California Democratic Party v. Jones.8 It held that a California law that forced parties to
use a blanket primary in which any voter could participate was unconstitutional, thereby
granting political parties broad powers to define their own membership, subject to
limitations against discrimination and, potentially, against party-raiding.9
However, neither Jones nor any other case has provided much guidance on how to
resolve the second type of case, regarding rules governing access to primary ballots for
party members. Lacking guidance from above, lower courts have created a variety of
often-conflicting rules in these cases.10
Resolving the problems of this messy case law requires weighing the various
constitutional interests of candidates, voters, political party organizations and states. In
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order to do so, it is necessary to develop a theoretical metric for evaluating these relative
claims. Even if theoretically “thin” opinions maximize judicial flexibility, developing a
consistent jurisprudence on a topic as complicated as this one will require some
organizing principle.11
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have developed one such organizing
principle, a theory they describe as “politics as markets.”12 They argue that election law
should attempt to maximize the extent to which voter preference guides the choice of
elected officials.13 In order to do so, they argue, it is useful to analogize elections to
markets, voters to consumers and political parties to firms. However, the United States
uses single member districts for legislative elections and a “first past the post” (FPTP)
voting system under which the candidate with the most votes wins, no matter what
percentage of the vote she gets, there is a natural inclination towards having only two
political parties. This a natural duopoly, a structural market failure that raises the
11
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possibility of collusion and makes elections an inefficient means of translating voter
preferences into policies. 14 To solve this problem, Issacharoff and Pildes turned to antitrust law.15 The Constitution should be used to invalidate elections laws that are merely
efforts by elected officials from the two major parties to take advantage of their dominant
market position to exclude entry by third-party candidates or to eliminate competition
through some type of major-party collusive agreement.16
This paper will use the “politics as markets” hypothesis as a way to evaluate the
various claims of parties, voters and states in ballot access cases. However, it will argue
that Politics as Markets and the articles that have followed it have failed are flawed in
two basic ways: (1) they fail to flesh out the implications of comparing politics to
markets by ignoring economic theory, particularly natural monopoly theory and (2) the
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normative lens they embrace fails to capture and balance the variety of normative reasons
for valuing political competition.

A theory that solved these problems would view

current Supreme Court doctrine on primary ballot access laws as a success rather than a
failure of the politics as markets approach.
a) Natural Monopoly Theory and Election Law
Politics as Markets and the articles that followed proceeded from the description
of electoral markets as a natural duopoly to an argument that the courts should examine
election laws the way the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission would
examine firm behavior in an ordinary market in which a few firms exhibit a great deal of
market power, focusing on collusive deals and the formation of new barriers to entry.17
This ignores the factors that make electoral markets a “natural,” rather than an ordinary,
duopoly.
French political scientist Maurice Duverger found that an electoral system that
featured both first-past-the-post vote counting and single member electoral districts
would always tend towards producing a stable two-party system.18 He gave two
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explanations for this: one “psychological,” the other “mechanical.” The psychological
explanation is that voters do not like to waste their votes.19 If one assumes that voters
make their choices in order to influence the election, they will vote for the candidate
closest to their views with a chance to win. 20 This has the effect of strengthening two
major parties, because any vote for a third party candidate will not affect the result. The
mechanical explanation is that parties that win less than a majority of the vote win no
seats in the American electoral system.21 This lack of actual success reduces the
incentives for leaders and donors to support the party. Self-interested politicians and
donors flee to the major parties, which are thereby strengthened.
Implicit in the first of Duverger’s explanations is that, given the structural
problems of FPTP electoral systems, having only two parties produces the most
representative elected officials. This is because it produces majority, rather than
plurality, elections (i.e., a candidate disfavored by a majority of voters cannot win an
election because the other side is divided between two candidates). Having only two
parties is not only the likely result of a FPTP system, but it is the best result inside such a
system, if the value one desires to maximize is “representativeness.” Therefore, rules that
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enhance the likelihood of having only two parties increase the chances for this best
result.22
However, Issacharoff and Pildes are right to note that having a duopoly raises
concerns that the two parties will not produce a robustly competitive electoral market. In
the language of economic theory, a natural duopoly is a structural market failure. That
said, its structural nature – because of FPTP elections, we will almost always have only
two major parties – means that policies that would ordinarily be efficient in dealing with
a market failure, like the anti-trust approach of Politics as Markets, are not necessarily
efficient means of regulating a market with this peculiar feature.
Economists have long attempted to solve a similar problem that besets
commercial markets, the problem of natural monopoly. Natural monopolies occur when,
as a result of peculiar market forces, an industry is most efficient when one firm
dominates production because of economies of scale. In these markets (e.g. electricity
distribution, local telephony), unlike most, it is better for the economy if there is a
monopoly, but there is the danger that the monopolist will take advantage of its favored
position.
The enormous economic and legal literature on natural monopolies is organized
around the principle that in some markets there are natural barriers to entry and
promoting the entry of new firms would be inefficient. The literature advises regulators
to give natural monopolists the opportunity to entrench themselves, because natural
22

This, of course, presumes that political competition between the two parties and the possibility of entry

(and of replacing one of the existing two parties with another organization) keeps the major parties active in
their pursuit of voters. A law that ensured that only two parties could exist would, of course, violate this
presumption and not enhance the likelihood of a most representative result.

9

monopolies only arise, by definition, when “production of a particular good or service by
a single firm minimizes cost.” 23 However, regulators should make sure that natural
monopolists do not use their market power to raise prices. Further, they should try to
segment related markets that do not feature the structural market failure of natural
duopoly and thereby create possibilities for free down-stream competition.
Though courts have used a variety of explanations and theoretical assumptions in
this murky jurisprudence, almost all of the actual holdings in primary ballot access cases
follow the natural monopoly model of regulation. The Supreme Court has permitted
states to favor a two-party system, which fits with the idea that it is inefficient to replicate
firms/parties in natural monopoly or duopoly situations.24 The Court has also permitted
party organizations to define their membership how they see fit,25 but have, potentially,
limited this right by allowing states to make sure parties do not allow members of other
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parties to participate in their primaries.26 These membership rules help keep parties
distinct from one another, which prevents collusion and thus fosters competition.27 This
competition limits their ability to take advantage of their favored positions in the political
firmament.
The Court, however, has not followed the final important implication of the
analogy to natural monopoly regulation. It has never settled on a rule on how the
Constitution regulates party rules that limit who among party members can be on the
primary ballot. It should adopt a rule that ensures downstream, or primary election,
competition using the constitutional right to associate with candidates of one’s choice to
ensure that neither states nor party organizations create serious hurdles to primary ballot
access for party members. Such a rule would maximize the extent to which elected
officials were representative of the preferences of voters in an electoral market
characterized by “natural duopoly,” even if it did not create a perfectly functioning
market for elections.
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b) Competitive Democratic Theory and Election Law
Just as the application of economic theory can improve the “politics as markets”
approach, democratic theory can be mined for insights into how to create a jurisprudence
out of a theory of political competition. Many theorists have criticized the idea that
elections and politics should be understood through a market metaphor because it is too
simple, reducing the rich realm of democratic society to simple power politics.28 While it
is beyond the ambit of this paper to respond to this critique,29 any attempt to use
competition as a value for Constitutional adjudication faces a nearly opposite problem.
There are too many normative justifications for using competition rather than too few and
the policies that flow from an embrace of one such justification conflict with those that
would flow from the use of another.
“Competitive” models of democracy are, generally speaking, of two types: the
kind exemplified most clearly by Issacharoff and Pildes and the model associated with
famed Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. Issacharoff and Pildes state quite clearly
what value they think a competitive party system should maximize. “Only through an
appropriately competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of
democratic politics be realized: that the policy outcomes of the political process be
responsive to the interests and views of citizens.”30
28
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Schumpeter, on the other hand, cared little about the representativeness of
government.31 Elections, he argued, were merely competitions between elites in order to
control the machinery of the state.32 Voters did not have an interest in developing their
capacity to discuss political issues, meaning that a government produced simply through
their negotiations would not be competent; the capacity of individuals is merely to be
able to determine their local interests and to determine whether the current government is
meeting them.33 Voters, though, are intimately aware of their own situation and should
be given the opportunity to use their vote merely as a vote of confidence in the current
state of affairs.34 This requires major parties to be different from one another; otherwise,
there can be no referendum on the current government and hence no retrospective voting.
Even individual voters did have an interest in thinking clearly about politics
Schumpeter argued that negotiations among them about difficult issues in a mass society
would lead to conflict.35 Once the problems of individual incentive to engage reasonably
31
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with politics are added to this natural conflict, people will disagree and disagree to an
extent that would imperil the stability of the government and perhaps lead to revolt in
times of crisis.36 What is necessary is an individual or party with decisive control over
governmental decisions, checked, though, by the prospect of being thrown out of office in
the next election (or by party revolt). The key is the decisive control of the machinery of
government – if it is clear who, by dint of majority election, is in power then the
government can make decisions in response to external concerns and individuals will be
less likely to dispute governmental decisions because they will clearly represent the
mandate of the majority.37
Electoral competition in Schumpeter’s model, then, serves two purposes; it gives
myopic voters clear, simple choices and provides society as a whole with clear result
about who will constitute the government, thereby improving the functioning of
government in times of stress and, perhaps most importantly, reducing the likelihood of
revolt.

36
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The simplest way to understand the connection between these two theories is to
think of the Pildes and Issacharoff model as focusing on the way competition makes a
democratic state more democratic, while Schumpeter’s ideas focus on the ways in which
elite competition allows a democratic state to survive as a state. Another way of thinking
about this is to note that Issacharoff and Pildes have adopted an equilibrium approach to
maximizing public satisfaction, arguing that laws that limit the extent to which
government policy reflects the policy preferences of voters today, while the
Schumpeterian method is dynamic, trying to maximize satisfaction over time, assuming
that no one (or, at least, very few people) prefers to have their short-term lack of
knowledge translated into governmental policy or societal strife created by unclear
electoral results. This type of dispute is directly analogous to one of the crucial debates
in antitrust law, where Schumpeter himself (he was primarily an economist) claimed that
maximizing short-term efficiency harmed the incentive to create new ideas (or to engage
in “creative destruction”).38
38
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Current Supreme Court doctrine in election law strikes a balance between the
positive and negative, static and dynamic efficiency.39 The first way it does this is laid
out above; by defining rights in a way consistent with natural duopoly competition (or
rather, by protecting the component parts of natural duopoly competition) the Court
allows states to promote an electoral system that naturally respects the two
Schumpeterian constraints. FPTP/single district elections tend to promote a two-party
system and therefore clear choices for voters and clear winners and losers in elections.
Beyond this, the Court has given states the ability to justify regulations that impinge on
the component parts of natural duopoly competition if the state interests are strong and
legitimate and the regulation is necessary to vindicate these interests.40 The interests that
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antitrust laws to limit the most egregious monopolies is most associated with Frank Easterbrook. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (1984)
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the Court has found to be even potential justification for burdening electoral rights have
been those that promote decisive results and clear choices for voters.41 If there is a
fundamental conflict between representative and Schumpeterian values, the Court is left
to weigh the relative harms. This is not a solution to the fundamentally moral question
about the relative value of representation and stability,42 but it does limit the grounds on
which such a decision can be made. Further, it lays out the possible justifications and
factual predicates for deciding that one or another of these values should win out. This is
the most one can expect of doctrine – it limits but does not remove the necessity of
judicial judgment – and therefore is a reasonable approach to an irresolvable conflict.
c) Combining the Two Critiques: Politics as Markets Redeemed
such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It must first consider
the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court
must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all
these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (citations excluded)..
41
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This paper, then, consists of two, interlocking arguments. The first is that the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights the Supreme Court has decided to recognize in
the field of election law are consistent with a “natural duopoly” regulation, and that this
promotes representative government given the structural features of the American
electoral system. The second is that the test the Court has used in these cases – one that
promotes duopoly competition but permits states to impose regulations that burden the
component parts of competition if they are necessary to promote clear choices for voters
or decisive election results – provides a fair, reasonable metric by which fundamental
differences about the nature of democracy can be resolved. Thus, though it has not made
itself perfectly clear on this score, the Supreme Court created a jurisprudential scheme
that nearly optimally marries the two conflicting normative justifications for electoral
competition.
In his insighful dissent in Vieth v. Jubelier, Justice Breyer made clear that the
Supreme Court shared this vision of its role:
“There must also be a method for transforming the will of the majority into
effective government. This Court has explained that political parties play a
necessary role in that transformation. At a minimum, they help voters assign
responsibility for current circumstances, thereby enabling those voters, through
their votes for individual candidates, to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with
the political status quo. Those voters can either vote to support that status quo or
vote to "throw the rascals out." …. A party-based political system that satisfies this
minimal condition encourages democratic responsibility. It facilitates the
transformation of the voters' will into a government that reflects that will.”
“[O]ne should begin by asking why single-member electoral districts are the norm,
why the Constitution does not insist that the membership of legislatures better
reflect different political views held by different groups of voters. History, of
course, is part of the answer, but it does not tell the entire story. The answer also
lies in the fact that a single-member-district system helps to assure certain
democratic objectives better than many ‘more representative’ (i.e., proportional)
electoral systems. Of course, single-member districts mean that only parties with
candidates who finish "first past the post" will elect legislators. That fact means in
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turn that a party with a bare majority of votes or even a plurality of votes will often
obtain a large legislative majority, perhaps freezing out smaller parties. But singlemember districts thereby diminish the need for coalition governments. And that
fact makes it easier for voters to identify which party is responsible for government
decisionmaking (and which rascals to throw out), while simultaneously providing
greater legislative stability.”43

Breyer endorsed a view that the Constitution prohibits state laws that impair the singlemember district system from producing decisive electoral results, easy distinctions
between the parties and competition between the major parties. Though this was a
dissent, this remains the best definition of what current Supreme Court doctrine is in the
area of election law. This paper stands as an explanation and defense of this
understanding of the Constitution’s role in elections.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: Section II will examine the
justifications inside democratic theory for privileging competition as a constitutional
value and explain how the Supreme Court has succeeded in coming up with a metric for
weighing conflicting justifications. Section III will show how incorporating natural
monopoly theory would improve the idea of electoral markets; Section IV will survey the
state of primary ballot access law and argue that it is largely consistent with existing
ideas about optimal regulation under natural duopoly conditions; Section V serves as a
brief conclusion.
II.

43

Two Theories of “Competitive Democracy”

Vieth v. Jubelier, 124 S. Ct. 1822-25 (2004) (Breyer J., dissenting).
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When contrasted with “deliberative” or “participatory” models of democracy,
“competitive” models are usually treated as being of a type. 44 This rhetorical move
groups together all theorists who rely on the analogy between markets and politics and
view elections through the lens of competition between candidates for votes rather than
as a discussion between voters on how to best make decisions. However, such a move
masks deep divisions among the theoretical justifications for valuing competition.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of competitive models: (1) those that focus
on maximizing the extent to which electoral outcomes are representative of the opinions
of voters and (2) those, like Joseph Schumpeter’s, that support competition because it
promotes clear choices for voters and decisive electoral outcomes and therefore reduces
societal conflict. The policies that believers of either of these models support inevitably
conflict – the system of election laws that produce the most representative legislature
would not necessarily produce decisive results and vice versa.
An examination of these two models shows that it is impossible to determine
theoretically which is more important for a democracy. Yet conflicts persist and must be
solved. The Supreme Court has solved this problem as well as it could possibly be
expected to, by reducing this theoretical conflict to a factual one. It defines associational
rights in the electoral context in such a way that states are not allowed to engage in
regulation that harms the component parts of the type of competition that promotes
representative outcomes in a FPTP system, unless their regulations are enacted to ensure
44

See, e.g., LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, 166-69 (discussing “Concept 2”

democracy, a model that combines Schumpeter and theories based on the importance of representation);
Bruce Cain, Party Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral Competition, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 794 (2001)
(grouping together Robert Dahl, Anthony Downs and Schumpeter).
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decisive outcomes and clear choices for voters. If these regulations are enacted for these
purposes, the Court weighs the effect of the regulation along these axes and determines
which is more significantly harmed.
Thus, while in extreme cases the Court would be forced to choose between the
two concepts of competition, the jurisprudence has reduced the type of arguments that
can justify restrictive electoral regulations and provided a set of factual predicates on
which an ultimate decision-maker could base her decision. In contested matters, this is
the best doctrine can achieve and the Supreme Court’s electoral jurisprudence should
therefore be considered a success.
Arguing for the essential reasonability of the Supreme Court’s approach to
resolving conflicts between the two basic competitive models requires, as a first step,
laying out both of the models. This will be followed by a discussion of the jurisprudence
in the language of the models.
A. Competition and Representativeness:
In contemporary legal literature, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have
created one of the most complete models for the examination of elections laws.45 In
“Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process,” they argue that the
best way to judge election laws is to determine how representative the elected are of the
preferences of the electorate.46 This is analogous to the question we ask of markets,
namely whether they are operating efficiently. Constitutional review of election laws
45

See Politics as Markets, supra note _, at 643.

46

“Only through an appropriately competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of

democratic politics be realized: that the policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the
interests and views of citizens.” Id. at 646.
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should exist to fix any market failures.47 The particular failure Issacharoff and Pildes
were worried about was the way in which elected officials, as members of parties, create
rules that favor the existing parties and hence violate the efficiency of the electoral
market.
Although relatively simple, the model has proved remarkably robust, providing
analytical insight on issues as distinct as gerrymandering, blanket primaries, fusion
candidacies and campaign finance.48 One of the reasons for its success is its parsimony;
it proposes that courts use one value, competition, rather than a complex mélange of
interests, as a guide to deciding all election law cases.
Competition, though, is a means and not an end. The reason for valuing party
competition, in Issacharoff and Pildes’s view, is that it produces governmental policymaking that is responsive to the preferences of voters.49 This concept draws heavily upon
the work of political scientists working in a public choice idiom. Specifically, it is based
on a vision of political party behavior most famously seen in the work of Anthony
47

“But politics shares with all markets a vulnerability to anticompetitive behavior… Where there is an

appropriately robust market in partisan competition, there is less justification for judicial intervention.
Where courts can discern that existing partisan forces have manipulated these background rules, courts
should strike down those manipulations in order to ensure an appropriately competitive partisan
environment.” Id. at 646, 648.
48

See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 684, 687 (2003) (applying the Politics

as Markets hypothesis to gerrymandering); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes:
Political Parties, Associational Freedoms and Partisan Competition, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 274, 276 (2001)
(Hereinafter “Private Parties”) (blanket primaries); Politics as Markets, supra note 12, at 683-91 (fusion
and campaign finance laws).
49

See Politics as Markets, supra note 12, at 646.
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Downs, who saw parties as rational actors with the sole goal of maximizing their vote
totals.50 Downs surmised that parties would change their policies in order to maximize
their vote, much like firms operating in a consumer market tailor their goods to the tastes
of consumers. For example, businesses locating themselves along a street will space
themselves differently based on the number of competing stores in order to gain
competitive advantage by reducing the transportation costs of consumers located along
the street.51 Imagine a street with only one store: it would open shop in the middle of the
street to make it easier for all customers to reach it. If another firm decided to open on
the street, it would logically locate directly next door to the existing store, giving it an
advantage with exactly half the customers – those that are closer to it than they are to the
old store.52
This, according to Downs, is what happens with parties. Assuming voters are
arrayed along an ideological spectrum, two political parties will propose nearly identical
platforms, vying for the median voter.53 The party that gets the median voter will
presumably win all voters to her right/left (depending on which party it is.) Public policy
is hence what voters in the middle of the spectrum want.

50

See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, 114-16 (1957); Private Parties, supra

note 30, at 300 (“As set out initially in the work of Anthony Downs, we may follow the spatial model of
how…a party seeking an advantageous position among a heterogeneous electorate … would gravitate
toward the center so as to position himself or herself in proximity to the preferences of the greatest number
of voters.”).
51

See Downs, supra note __, at 117; Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 Econ. J. 41 (1929)
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See Hotelling, supra note _, at 41.
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See Downs, supra note _, at 115-17.
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This view of parties and of the electorate is admittedly simplistic, but it is still a
reasonable assumption that competition between political parties forces elected officials
to at least attempt to generate policies that represent the preferences of the electorate.54
Issacharoff and Pildes want to make sure that elected officials are responsive to these
pressures and are not able to insulate themselves from this competitive pressure by
passing laws that ensure electoral success.55 Removing such anti-competitive laws will
result in more representative policies because it will force the parties to compete more
vigorously for the median voter – just like the two businesses that end up side-by- side on
a strip.
What should be noted is that this is an equilibrium or static model; that is, it seeks
to make each election produce a government that is as responsive as possible to the
preferences of voters. As will be seen below, the weight of Schumpeter’s critique of both
market anti-trust laws and democratic systems, springs from his argument that markets
and democratic systems need to be understood dynamically, or over a number of periods
(elections) because attempting to produce the most efficient outcome in each and every
period does not necessarily produce the most efficient outcome over time.56

54

But see Entrenching the Duopoly, supra note _, at 721 n.13 (discussing the work of political scientists

who have criticized the median voter hypothesis).
55

See Politics as Markets, supra note _, at 647.
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Schumpeter model is often mistaken for focusing on equilibrium concerns. See JOHN MEDEARIS, JOSEPH

SCHUMPETER’S TWO THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY 178-82 (2001) (discussing how political scientists have
misunderstood Schumpeter as having created an equilibrium model). The reason he has been
misunderstood is that his was the first real model of competitive democracy and the economist/political
scientists who adopted a competitive framework were working in a neo-classical economic milieu. While
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That said, the general concept of producing a government that acts like the people
would like it to is a basic value of democracy, and in the popular conception, perhaps the
only value.57
B. Schumpeter’s Competitive Vision
For a theorist of democracy, Joseph Schumpeter cared little for the opinions of the
demos. In his most famous work, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter
laid out what he argued was a positive description of what democratic states really are
like, and in this vision, the opinions of voters about individual policies played little role.
Rather than being a system by which the people, with opinions on the issues of the day,
chose leaders to express and enact those preferences, “the democratic method is that
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”58 Elected
officials enact policies then look to the populace for sanction based on their effect; their
opposition claims that these policies were ineffective and that there are better
alternatives. Effective elections, under this understanding, are not those that accurately
translate the pre-existing preferences of the populace into policies – Schumpeter, rejected
the idea that the populace had meaningful preferences59 – but rather those that give voters
clear choices and produce decisive results, because such decisive results make it easier
Issacharoff and Pildes are an heir to this intellectual tradition, it is notably not consistent with Schumpeter’s
own ideas.
57

See Minimalist Conception, supra note _, at 32 (“’[R]epresentation, or its cognates, is frequently treated

as quintessential, if not definitional, for democracy.”)
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See CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 269.
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Id. at 270 (“Collectives act almost exclusively by accepting leadership.”)
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for governmental officials to enact a program that can then be judged by the electorate.
Perhaps more importantly, decisive electoral results reduce societal conflict, because it is
clear to losers that a majority of their peers disagree with them, and produce governments
solid enough to survive internal conflict and external crises.
While Schumpeter claimed his ideas were merely positive description,60 it is
important to see that, while this was not, broadly speaking, a falsehood, his model does
contain powerful normative ideas. The reason for this apparent contradiction is that his
ideas relate to the question of how a democratic state can survive. Schumpeter believed
his “thin” conception of democracy, as opposed to those that rely heavily on “thicker”
ideas about complex mass deliberation, was the only one that produced governments able
to survive crises and reduce societal conflict to a tolerable level.61 Therefore it stood as a
positive description of existing mass democratic states that they were, in fact, behaving as
Schumpeter claimed they were because if they did not, they would not exist (or would
move to a system based on a thinner conception of democracy). Thus, though it was, in
his mind, descriptive, Schumpeter was actually arguing that a certain conception of
democracy increased the likelihood of state survival and was, when the problems of mass
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“Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at

political – legislative and administrative—decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself,
irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions.” CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
AND DEMOCRACY,
61

supra note _, at 242.

Id. at 252-62; For a modern day Schumpeterian’s argument that the strongest justification for democracy

is its ability to reduce societal conflict and the possibility of revolution, see Minimialist Conception, supra
note _, at 48-49.
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decision-making in nations featuring severe disagreements among its people and external
pressures were taken into account, the only real choice for modern democracies.62
This distinction between modern, mass democracies, which feature conflict
between its citizens and no meaningful way of mediating these differences through
deliberation, and democracies in homogenous, small nations, where these are not serious
problems, is crucial to understanding Schumpeter’s rejection of “classical” theories of
democracy.63 His argument against such earlier conceptions was that they misunderstood
the difficulty of aggregating preferences and translating that into public policy. “There
is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree
on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument.” 64 The idea of a common
good, a best set of government policies, that can be generated out of negotiations and
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Schumpeter argued that the “classical doctrine” of democracy, rooted in an opposite conception of

democracy, did describe some political communities. “[I]t must not be forgotten that there are social
patterns in which the classical doctrine will fit facts with a sufficient degree of approximation. As has been
pointed out, this is the cse with many small and primitive societies which as a matter of fact served as a
prototype to the authors of that doctrine. It may be the case also with societies that are not primitive
provided they are not too differentiated and do not harbor any serious problems. Switizerland is the best
example. There is so little to quarrel about in a world of peasants, which, excepting hotels and banks,
contains no great capitalist industry, and the problems of public policy are so simple and so stable that an
overwhelming majority can be expected to understand them and agree about them. But if we can conclude
that in such cases the classical doctrine approximates reality we have to add immediately that it does so not
because it describes an effective mechanism of political decision but only because there are no great
decisions to be made.” Id. at 267.
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Id. at 250-68.
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Id. at 251.
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discussions between the people is a fiction, except perhaps in a small New England town
where disagreements can be hashed out in town hall.65 In a large heterogeneous society,
people disagree about what is good and, even where they agree about a metric for what is
good, disagree about which policies will best produce that good, and disagree to the
extent that mere argument is unlikely to get them to resolve their disagreements.66
Further, in a mass rather than a small society, people have little reason to understand the
complex issues of governance, making broad societal agreement about either means or
ends even more difficult.67 Support for democracy cannot be based on the belief that
such an agreement will occur; rather, democracy exists as a political method to produce
workable policies despite the existence of such disagreement.
In his crucial if flawed book “Joseph Schumpeter’s Two Theories of Democracy,”
John Medearis misses this point.68 He argues that Schumpeter’s career and earlier
writings reveal that he really believed that democratic deliberation and education had a
transformative effect on citizens and could serve to convince people who otherwise
would disagree to come to common answers about contested questions in certain areas.69
In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter rejected that agreement could ever
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Id. at 246.
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“Americans who say, ‘We want this country to arm to its teeth and then to fight for what we conceive to

be right all over the globe’ and Americans who say, ‘We want this country to work out its own problems
which is the only way it can serve humanity” are facing irreducible differences of ultimate values which
compromise could only maim and degrade.” Id. at 251.
67

68

69

Id. at 256-64.
See Medearis, supra note _, at 1.
Id. at 57-64
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be found on political issues in a modern democratic state. In Medearis’s view, the reason
for this apparent contradiction was ideological.70 Uncomfortable with the potential
radical results of expanded democracy, Schumpeter created an elite conception of
democracy as a method in order to blunt the tendencies towards the extreme versions of
socialism he thought were the likely outcome of democratic methods.71
This view fails to understand Schumpeter’s work in the context of explaining
modern mass democracies. To understand why, it is necessary to explain exactly what
assumptions Schumpter made and did not make about the behavior of voters when
making political decisions. In his section “Human Nature in Politics,” Schumpter makes
heavy use of famed “mob” theorists Pareto and Le Bon.72 They argued that men were
far from rational, but rather prone to irrational group behavior. Schumpeter concluded
“the electoral massis incapable of action other than a stampede.”

73

The key to Schumpeter’s reading of these writers, though, is that he thought them
insightful but not absolutely correct. Le Bon, he noted, “overstress[es] the realities of
human behavior.”74 Human beings do not, after all, always act as crazed mobs.
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“To put this differently…the only reason he could have to insist on the elite assumptions about human

nature he chose was to preclude the kind of spread of democratic practices proponents of developmental
theories would favor.” Id. at 133
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“But the full import of his elite conception of democracy is best understood in light of the deeply

authoritarian picture he drew of democratic socialism. While this was by no means a picture of
Schumpeter’s idea society, it was his version of a society in which elite rule and convservative values could
persist despite the tendencies leading toward socialism.” Id. at 139.
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See CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 256-64.
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Id. at 257.
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Medearis places a great deal of weight on the small passage in Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy where Schumpeter limits his reliance on the mob theorists.75 In this passage,
Schumpeter claims that individual citizens can act rationally and without the “irrational
prejudice and impulse;” when making decisions about “himself, his family, his business
dealings, his hobbies, his friends and enemies, his township and ward, his class, church,
trade union or any other social group of which he is an active member – the things under
his personal observations, the things which are familiar to him independently of what his
newspaper tells him.”76 This is, in Medearis’s view, an enormous concession to
“theorists of democracy who have stressed the importance of developing the capacity for
democratic participation” because, if one believes that citizens could develop the capacity
to make rational choices about their trade union or social group, then, if given the
opportunity, citizens are, in fact, capable of developing the capacity to engage in
decision-making about national affairs.77
Schumpeter did reply to this critique, making a sharp distinction between those
things that people can know about (matters close to home) and those they could not, like
political affairs. Medearis calls this “deeply dissatisfying,” but only because he
misunderstands the point.78 Schumpeter was an unconventional economist, to be sure,
but an economist all the same79 and his belief that people were able to develop the
75

See Medearis, supra note _, at 120-33.
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Id. at 258-59.
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Medearis, supra note _, at 120
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Id. at 121.
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“Schumpeter was a great economist; and though his theory of democracy is not formally economic, it

bears the stamp of his profession.” LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 188.
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capacity to make decisions (through repetition) about their everyday life was rooted very
firmly in his belief that it is in their interestto act rationally in those fields.
Normally, the great political questions take their place in the psychic economy of
the typical citizen with those leisure-hour interests that have not attainted the rank
of hobbies , and with the subjects of irresponsible conversation. These things seem
so far off; they are not at all like a business propositions: dangers may not
materialize at all and if they should they may not prove so very serious; one feels
oneself to be moving in a fictious world. This reduced sense of reality accounts not
only for a reduced sense of responsibility but also for the absence of effective
volition….. All of this goes to show that without the initiative that comes from
immediate responsibility, ignorance will persist in the face of masses of
information however complete or correct.80
The assumption he makes about human nature here is not radical; he merely claims that
people are better at solving easier questions than they are at hard ones and are more likely
to be good at solving questions that are important for them (on a personal level) to solve.
In economic terms, he is arguing that learning how to make good political decisions is a
public good, with a positive net benefit for society but where no individual has the
incentives to bear his or her share of the costs. Schumpeter believed that average citizens
had little reason to develop the capacity to think about the big issues facing a nation and,
as such, the people (rather than people) could not make anything other than uninformed,
irrational decisions about policy.81 Moreover, issues important to the state generally will
never have the level of independent importance to individuals that their work and
families will because their share of the benefits will be low as will their share of the
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CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 261-62.
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“Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the

political field.” Id. at 262.
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costs.82 The capacity of individuals is, for the most part, unimportant– even if certain
people have the ability to learn how to make such decisions, the people as a whole (“the
electoral mass”) have no such capacity because it will never be in the interest of any one
of them (except those who run for office and hence receive the perks of office) to develop
it. For Medearis, this is a limit of democratic planning, because democratic systems
ought to be designed such that people develop their capacity to make decisions.83
Schumpeter believed that democratic systems in massive, modern democracies could not
be developed in such a way because of the inevitable difference in interest for almost all
citizens between making local decisions that affect them directly and high political
decisions that affect them at a level of remove.
Medearis’s misunderstanding of the distinction between the ability of people and
the ability of the people, or the electoral mass, in Schumpeter’s work is central to his
claim that Schumpeter was really a transformative theorist. Schumpeter notably thought
of politicians as “entreprenural innovators” who “create new combinations, innovative
party programs and platforms that exploit long-standing political opportunities and unmet
preferences and needs.”84 Medearis responds to this by asking “why should we suppose
that only elite professional politicians can engage in this sort of innovation?”85 The short
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answer is that we do not (or, rather, Schumpeter does not). Schumpeter did not define
“elites” to only include a small class of people but rather all people who try to run for
office. It is an empirical observation (and one that holds up under many different
political systems) that this is a small fraction of the population. The analogy holds: Only
a few people, a small percentage of the population, are entrepreneurs. The issue is not
whether anyone has the ability to start a successful firm, since clearly someone can.
Acknowledging this does not mean that everyone is capable or has an interest in coming
up with innovative ideas for products and services that others will want to buy.
Similarly, the question is not whether people have the ability to deliberate on political
issues, as clearly some do, but rather whether the people can do so on a mass scale.
Schumpeter argued that they cannot.
Moreover, he argued it would be dangerous if they did. Mass decision-making,
unimpeded by elite competition, could in Schumpeter’s model, lead to state collapse.
Because he did not believe in a stable, easily identifiable social consensus along the lines
of Rousseau, he believed that interference with a competitive model that produced
decisive results would lead to conflict and potentially state collapse.
Schumpeter wrote a review of F.A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom that makes this
view clear.86 He claimed that “the book, for a political book, takes surprisingly little
account of the political structures of our time.”87 While he, like Hayek, hated socialism,
in this article Schumpeter praises the English conservatives who had embraced part of a
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socialist agenda (and were criticized by Hayek).88 His argument, contra Hayek’s
libertarian claim that socialism and democracy are incompatible, was that the drive
towards some type of democratic socialism was inevitable and that it was important for
elites to control the situation to avoid social collapse. Medearis writes “the point was to
understand those tendencies and theorize a form of democratic socialism that would still
be consistent with Schumpeter’s conservative values.”89 This is a mischaracterization:
Schumpeter’s ‘conservative values’ were a belief that social structures needed to take
certain forms in order to survive. Medearis excoriates Schumpeter for embracing a
conception of the democratic state that was, in his view, questionably democratic.
Schumpeter focused on the other side of this: what makes democratic states – socialist or
not – remain states. It was his belief that the decisiveness of elite competition provided
the means by which governments could be formed and decisions could be made inside a
mass state where people disagreed with one another.
It is important, then, to return to his beliefs about how people and the people
make their decisions. The one crucial assumption in Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy about individuals is not, as Medearis claims, that Schumpeter believed they
cannot learn about issues if given incentives, but rather that, even after negotiation and
thought, people are likely to disagree with one another.
“[E]ven if the opinions and desires of individual citizens were perfectly definite and
independent data for the democratic process to work with, and if everyone acted on
them with ideal rationality and promptitude, it would not necessarily follow that the
political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those
individual volitions would represent anything that could any convincing sense be
called the will of the people. It is not only conceivable but, whenever individual
88
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wills are much divided, very likely that the political decisions produced will not
conform to “what people really want.” If people were to deliberate and actively
participate in politics, but were faced with both their limited capacity and the
inevitability of conflicting. Nor can it be replied that, if not exactly what they
want, they will get a “fair compromise.” This may be so. The chances for this to
happen are greatest with those issues which are quantitative in nature or admit to
gradation… But with qualitative issues, such as the question whether to persecutre
heretics or to enter upon a war, the result attained may well, though for different
reasons, be equally distasteful to all the people….[In such a situation] deadlock or
interminable struggle, engendering increasing irritation, would have been the most
probably outcome of any attempt to settle the question democratically.90
This is because people disagree with another about fundamental questions. As noted
above, Schumpeter claimed, “There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined
common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of
rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want
things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to
different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things.”91
The key is that even rational argument or negotiation will not serve to produce solid
outcomes.
But a state needs to make choices in order to survive – it needs to make policies to
produce security and economic welfare – and it needs to make choices in such a way that
those choices are accepted (at least in the passive form of not being rebelled against) by
the citizenry. If the decision about who will make decisions is not clear, then there will
be “deadlock and interminable struggle.”92 This is made worse by the problems of the
mass state, in which people are not fully informed (and, as was noted above, have no
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incentive to be). Who wins the struggle for office is less important than that someone
wins clearly. If election results are not decisive, then elections have failed to solve the
problem of decision-making in a mass state and there will be continued conflict over
policies.
In ordinary times, perhaps, such indeciveness is not a problem. Certain societies,
including “small and primitive” ones, and nations that do not have existential crises to
face, may feature enough agreement that clear electoral decisions are not necessary.93
However, in times of “stress,” the failure of a society to produce clear decisions could
lead to revolution or external weakness. The inherent conflict between the individual
values means that some system must be devised whereby the choices of individuals are
translated into clear, stable governments.
This is why Schumpeter opposed proportional representation. “It is in fact
obvious not only that proportional representation will offer opportunities for all sorts of
idiosyncrasies to assert themselves but also that it may prevent democracy from
producing efficient governments and thus prove a danger in times of stress.”94
In contrast, in Schumpeter’s model, power resides entirely in the hands of the
Prime Minister and his government, who, once selected, enjoy full power to make
decisions until they are defeated (either by the parliament or in the next election). This
puts enormous power in the hands of one person, of course, but this was, for Schumpeter,
both inevitable (because otherwise there would be disagreement) and agreeable, because
it created incentives for creative leadership.
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In order to understand this last point, we have to turn towards Schumpeter’s
economic theory. Even more than his contributions to democratic theory, Schumpeter is
known for his idea of “creative destruction.”95 His effective claim is that, were
equilibrium models of competition accurate to reality, there would inevitably be
economic stagnation. This is because, in a competitive equilibrium, there are no profits –
competition has squeezed them out. As such, there are no resources to capture and to
reinvest in the creation of new ideas. This would ruin the central part of a capitalist
economy: the creation of new ideas that will serve to destroy old forms of production.
Fortunately, according to Schumpeter, actual competition does not produce equilibrium
efficiency, but rather produces dynamic efficiency or is efficient over time.96
Competition between firms has winners and losers, with the winners in a monopoly like
position and able to charge super-normal prices. Any effort to use governmental power to
limit this monopoly power was misguided because, even if it did serve to create an
economy that was more efficient today, it would not serve to create an overall more
efficient economy because there would be less incentive to create.
Economists have debated endlessly whether such monopolistic power leads to
more innovation or less.97 However, the connection between Schumpeter’s argument in
favor of monopoly and his theory of democracy is clear. An electoral system should
produce decisive electoral results for the same reason it should produce decisive
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economic ones – it increases the stability and hence the desirability of winning. The
result should be better policies and a surer hand at the helm (because the competition for
the position had been fierce) during times of stress.
All of this leaves us with an important question; what role can Schumpeter’s
model play in resolving constitutional problems dealing with election law. From
Schumpeter’s model, one can draw two major values that he thought were necessary for
the maintaining a stable democracy: decisive electoral results and simple, binary choices
for voters. A Constitutional system that respected Schumpeterian principles would
ensure that no electoral rules were passed that violated these conditions.
c. Combining The Two Models: The Supreme Court’s Steady Hand
From these two discussions, it should be clear that the two models conflict both
about the reasons for valuing political competition and about the rules by which that
competition should be guided. Without coming to some kind of accommodation (or the
rejection of one side or the other) between Schumpeterian and equilibrium efficiency
principles, competitive democratic theory cannot serve to help create a consistent
jurisprudence.
One way to approach this problem is to note the weakness of the idea that
elections can ever truly be representative. Political scientist Adam Przewroski adeptly
makes this argument.98 He notes that there are two major problems with any attempt to
justify the use of democratic methods because they produce representative government:
(1) the citizenry may have no definite opinion about political issues and (2) may be poor
judges of what is in their interest even when making determinations about whether a
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politician has done well in office in the previous term.99 If people do not have a definite
idea about what is in their interest, it becomes illogical to claim that elected officials can
be representative of the desires of the electorate, because there is nothing they can be
representative of. If people are myopic, and are hence bad judges of what is in their longterm interest, ex post evaluations (i.e. retrospective voting based on performance) also are
flawed.
Both of these assumptions about voters seem reasonable – voters have little
interest in forming definite opinions about issues of the day and are often myopic. Thus,
the only way to determine if politicians act in the interests of voters is some outside
standard – a determination based on some objective criteria.100 But there is no outside
body to determine these criteria. “We will arrive at different judgments, for we are
‘people,’ participants rather than impartial observers.”101
The combination of these problems leaves representation at a loss. Unless the
citizenry know what is good ex ante, or can figure out ex post that some performance was
good, there is no way to judge whether a politician was representative of the people.
Further, decisions made by any type of majority rule (at the level of elections or in the
legislature) do not necessarily include the views of those who lose, leaving it unclear
whether decisions are representative of the entirety population or some subset.102 If we
cannot judge whether elections are representative, maximizing the extent to which they
are representative seems foolhardy.
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Przeworski moves from this dismissal to a defense of a Schumpeterian system.
His normative starting point is that “we want to avoid bloodshed, resolving conflicts
through violence.”103 He first argues that the possibility of being able to change
governments through some means limits this type of violence. This is because losers in
any political contest will see the likelihood that they will win in the future. Therefore,
even if they could gain in the short-term by revolting and, at some cost to themselves,
prevail in the political contest, they will not revolt because they see the possibility of
winning in the future.104 This condition is met by flipping a coin to decide political
problems, though, and hardly justifies having a decision system based on voting.105
His second claim is more persuasive; he claims that voting constitutes “flexing
muscles,” or that majority rule broadly though not specifically coincides with the ability
of a majority to impose its beliefs on the minority through force.106 Put in simple terms,
minorities accept majority rule through elections because they couldn’t upset it through
violence.
“If elections are a peaceful substitute for rebelling…it is because they inform
everyone who would mutiny and against what. They inform the losers – ‘here is
the distribution of force: if you disobey the instructions conveyed by the results of
the election, I will be more likely to beat you than you will be able to beat me in a
violent confrontation’ – and the winners ‘if you do not hold elections again or if
you grab too much, I will be able to put up a forbidding resistance.’”107
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This, though, is a contingent claim. Even if we ignore the problem that there is no
particular reason to assume, a priori, that a majority is more likely to win in a violent
confrontation than certain minorities,108 we are faced with the problem that we need only
worry about differences that are so serious that people will revolt against them no matter
what the result. Institutional design should only respond to actual and not to theoretical
problems and so it should only create systems that deal with this problem when it actually
occurs.109
Przeworkski’s dismissal of representation is similarly contingent. While people
certainly do not have absolute views about all political issues, they certainly have some.
Similarly, citizens may not be perfect judges of their long-term interests but they are not
utterly incapable of making any such determinations. Representation, as an absolute
matter, may not be possible, but this does not mean that a limited conception of it is
incoherent or false; it just is not perfect.
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Thus, the Schumpeterian model and the representative model are similarly
problematic and, as an objective theoretical matter, there is no way to reject one in favor
of the other. Fortunately, courts at least do not need to solve these questions in absolute,
afactual manner. They can solve problems as they come up. Rather than attempting to
choose one model or another and solving their conflict, a court can maintain their
conflicting values and see, in certain cases, whether to favor representation as a value or
whether the stability that comes as a result of decisive election results should be
privileged. In each case, facts can be developed to show how much representation will
be harmed, and how democratic stability will be endangered, leaving a court with the
proper information to engage in its ultimate task of judgment.
The Supreme Court’s election law jurisprudence takes this approach; it maintains
the conflict between the two models as a matter of doctrine. To see whether state
election laws are constitutional, it first asks whether they burden protected constitutional
rights.110 This determination, as will be shown below, effectively amounts to a judgment
about whether they impermissibly infringe on rights that are necessary component parts
of the type of political competition that serves to produce representative outcomes.111
The Court determines whether these rights have been burden severely or not; that is, it
weighs the harm to representation. If there is any burden, a state must produce an interest
that could justify this burden, but the strength of the interest that can justify a burden
varies with the weight of the burden. The interests that the Court has recognized as
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potentially justifying burdens are those inherent in the Schumpeterian model: ensuring
clear choices for voters and decisive results in elections.112 The Court then decides
whether the interest justifies the burden.
This approach does not solve the problem created by the two conflicting
justifications for valuing political competition, as it leaves the final determination to the
Court with little guidance about which should win when the interests conflict. However,
by reducing the matter to facts and permissible arguments, the approach does create some
degree of predictability and fairness. Parties know what types of claims to bring and
states know they are limited to only a narrow set of justifications for restricting political
liberties. Further, the doctrine limits the arbitrariness of judicial decisions in this area –
they must justify their decisions with a type of argument that has theoretical justification.
Without some greater guidance about how to resolve fundamental conflicts of this type
(and it is unclear from where this could come), this is the best one can expect.
America’s peculiar history has given the Court some help. For much of American
history, the United States has used a single-member district/FPTP electoral system in all
Congressional races and in most legislative races throughout the country.113 As even the
avatars of representation argue, this is a permanent feature of American elections and,
because of their long-standing use, one that the Constitution should not be used to
112
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upset.114 The next section of this paper will argue that, under this constraint, the results
that promote representative outcomes also often serve Schumpeterian ends.
III. Politics as Imperfect Markets: Regulation under Natural Duopoly Conditions
While theorists have disputed both the merits of both the simple
“representativeness” metric and Schumpeter’s competitive democratic framework,
Issacharoff and Pildes have been subject to other lines of attack as well. Most important
among these is that their theory is not rooted at all in the Constitution and that it fails to
comprehensively deal with the implications of the market metaphor.115
Issacharoff and Pildes oppose a rights-based view of electoral systems. Such a
view has led, they argue, to a sterile constitutional discourse in which the deeper theories
of democracy embedded in judicial decisions are selected ad hoc.116 Since the
Constitution protects rights and does not speak much to the structural needs of
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democracy, charges of atextualism are not wrong, but they are not, in the end, important
either. Issacharoff and Pildes intended to create a theoretically firm concept of democracy
that can serve as a way to interpret rights clauses in the Constitution. Issacharoff has
argued:
“There is no narrow textual justification for almost any of the body of law
governing the political process…. It is difficult to see the gain from making
believe that the need to fill in the gaps in an aging Constitution is anything other
than a response to our experience with democratic governance. There is
certainly no gain in pretending that the answers to the questions of how to make
democracy work are compelled by vague terms such as "due process," "equal
protection," or "republican form of government." The same theoretical work
would have to be done to make concrete the democratic values to be read into
these open-textured clauses. Sometimes it is simply best to tell poor Virginia the
sad truth: sorry, there really is no Santa Claus.”117
This is right; in almost all election law cases, a number of individuals and groups –
political party organizations, individual party members, states, minority voters – have
Constitutional rights claims. Engaging in Constitutional review in this field must by
necessity privilege some theory; underlying the choice and application of types of
scrutiny must be a metric by which courts can weigh the variety of valid claims brought
before them.118 Moreover, though a variety of scholars have argued that, even if it is not
directly rooted in constitutional text, election laws should be built around a system of
individual rights,119 such a jurisprudence would fail to deal with the problems at the heart
117
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of the Constitutional regulation of elections. As Heather Gerken argues, “The salience of
political structures and groups to voting claims makes it difficult to fit them into a
conventional individual rights framework.”120
The Supreme Court has declared that competition is a value inherent in many of
these claims: “Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.”121 Issacharoff and Pildes argue
that a decision by the Supreme Court to privilege this value consistently over others
would create a more coherent (and better) jurisprudence. As Pildes wrote in his article,
The Theory of Political Competition, “Samuel Issacharoff and I attempt to make these
ideas concrete by developing one structural aim that the history of American law and
democracy suggests should be a particular focal point for courts. This aim is the
assurance of an appropriately competitive partisan political environment, or, to put it
more accurately, the assurance that "artificial" barriers to robust partisan competition not
claims and the difficulty in resting standing to sue on traditional, individualistic conceptions of harm. At
another level, the conventional taxonomy of state interests relevant to regulating politics is too narrow to
capture the range of considerations the courts actually take into account. Thus, in these areas we have
argued that constitutional doctrine is also concerned with "expressive harms" that can result from the values
the state expresses when it structures democratic institutions. These are not the conventional harms of
constitutional doctrine in other fields, but we have suggested that special concerns for the content of the
political culture seem to emerge from Supreme Court decisions that address the proper construction of
democratic politics.”)
120
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be permitted.”122 As noted above, this process-based solution has as normative backing
the goal of ensuring that elected officials are as representative of the opinions and
interests of voters as possible. Moreover, this is one instance in which the Supreme
Court is not faced with a “counter-majoritarian” difficulty; rather than frustrating
democratic will, it is serving to enhance it.123
While the “politics as markets” theory is proposed as a coherent alternative to
current ad hoc decision-making, it suffers from internal flaws. The largest of these is that
it fails to respond adequately to the problem caused by Duverger’s Law.124 As noted
122

Richard Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1609 (1999)

123

See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491

(1997); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). This is a
persuasive claim and is at the heart of one side of the debate about the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” It
is also a claim that maps nicely onto the Schumpeterian conditions suggested in this paper. If it is true that
courts are the only actors that can police political competition, it is also true that they are the actors least
likely to care about the specific outcomes of elections (and the trappings of power that come with them)
and be in a position to protect political stability from myopic, self-interested politicians. This is effectively
Richard Posner’s claim about Bush v. Gore, that the Justices properly took into consideration the need to
avoid a constitutional crisis. Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore as Pragmatic Adjudication, in A BADLY
FLAWED ELECTION (DEBATING) BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 187213 (ed, Ronald Dworkin, New Press, 2002) (Hereinafter Pragmatic Adjudication). Hence, the judicial
role is well-suited (and perhaps only suited) to solving both of these types of political problems.
124

Issacharoff and Pildes have been criticized for ignoring the true import of Duverger’s law before. See

Daniel Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics, pg 260-633 in THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (Daniel K. Ryden ed. 2000). Lowenstein makes several claims
about the way Duverger’s law clashes with Politics as Markets. The first is that, even if the Supreme Court
ruled in the way Issacharoff and Pildes advocate, overruling decisions like Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.

47

above, Duverger argued that FPTP systems inevitably result in a two-party system.125
Issacharoff and Pildes describe this as the “natural duopoly” problem of the American
electoral system. As a result, they argue, designing an election law system to create third
parties is futile; without getting rid of single member districts and FPTP, it would be
impossible. However, because elected officials come from political parties, there is a
chance for “inside dealing.” Borrowing from corporate law, they argue that rules that

428 (1992) and argued that the Constitution required voters to able to write-in candidates on both primary
and general election ballots, there would still be a two-party duopoly because of Duverger’s Law. “It is not
clear what difference it would make if the Court were to subscribe to their theory of partisan lockups as the
key to election law adjudication.” Id. at 263 This criticism misses the mark – Politics as Markets makes
explicit that the changes it proposes will not bring down the two-party system but will instead create
competitive pressures on it. Lowenstein makes no attempt to refute this claim. The problem with the
proposals of Politics as Markets is not that they would have no effect, as Lowenstein claims, but rather that
their effect would be to worsen that value they seek to enhance – the degree of representation – and would
endanger the Schumpeterian stability of the American electoral systems, rooted in the decisiveness of twoparty elections.
Lowenstein’s second criticism is that “academic theories such as those of…Issacharoff and Pildes
inevitably are woefully insufficient as guides to adjudication…The starting points for their theories are
much to narrow…These authors’ failure to make any serious inquiry into the nature of political competition
in the United Staes is more indicative than idiosyncratic.” Id. at 263. This paper is an attempt to solve this
problem – both by providing guides to solving certain future cases and by examining more closely the
effect structural factors like FPTP elections have on electoral markets.
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favor the two-party system should be given a “hard look.”126 Rules that incidentally help
the two parties should be considered acceptable, but, for instance, bans on “fusion”
candidates should be barred because they entrench the two parties.
As an effort to fashion a coherent jurisprudence, this view faces a major problem;
it does not explain why the Constitution should protect FPTP/single member district
elections at all. A consistent application of the values inherent in the rules favored by
Issacharoff and Pildes use would lead, rather mechanically, towards proportional
representation (PR). While a few authors have disputed this, it is relatively clear that our
FPTP system imposes a severe burden on the extent to which elected officials are
representative of voters’ preferences when compared with a PR scheme.127 Without some
other justification, like balancing Schumpeterian values with those of representation, it is
impossible to consistently apply the rules favored by Issacharoff and Pildes and maintain
FPTP elections.
Issacharoff and Pildes justify this claim by arguing that the Framers of the
Constitution did not favor FPTP/single-member district elections because they produced
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two-party politics. “Indeed, when the Constitution was formed and early elections held,
the very idea of political parties was anathema to the reigning conception of
democracy…The idea that the FPTP system would have been justified because of its
tendency to produce party politics, let alone two-party politics, could hardly have formed
any part of the justification for these structures.”128 As such, they argue that, though
FPTP/single member district elections should be protected as a historical anomaly, like
the Electoral College. “Courts should not infer out of these structures broad normative
principles that ought to govern the entire political process.”129
Even if one accepts this line of argument, the effect of constitutional regulations
on the political process changes when constraints, like FPTP/single member district
elections, are added. A doctrine that would produce efficient (i.e. representative) results
absent structural constraints does not necessarily do so when faced with implications of
such constraints. Even if the sole goal is to produce efficient/representative results, it
makes sense to build FPTP/single-member districts into the model because, otherwise,
we may diagnose a solution that cannot treat the problem that actually exists.
Politics as Markets and the articles that followed it acknowledge that there is a
market imperfection, a “natural duopoly,” but then merely argue that anti-competitive
behavior by the parties as a result of their market dominance should be constrained. They
treat this “natural duopoly” like an ordinary one. This is a mistake, but in order to
understand why it is a mistake, it is important to understand the extensive economic
literature on natural monopolies.
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Natural monopoly stands as one of the classic problems in the economics of
industrial organization.130 Natural monopolies exist when the cost of production of a
good is minimized when a single firm produces the entire market output because of
economies of scale (or, formally, declining long run average cost curves).131 The larger a
firm is in this type of industry is, the cheaper it will produce goods. This creates barriers
to entry – firms generally start off small and, in industries like these, small firms cannot
compete because their costs are to high. As a result, these markets tend towards having
one large firm. Moreover, by definition, this is the most efficient result. However, this
raises the risk of monopoly pricing: once there is only one firm, that firm will be able to
raise prices because of its monopoly position.132 An ideal form of natural monopoly
regulation would permit society to gain from economies of scale – by allowing one firm
to control all production – without allowing the monopoly to take advantage of its market
power.
In some industries, natural monopoly is a temporary condition.133 Often, there
will be economies of scale, but only to a point – average cost will stop declining and level
130
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off. If demand increases enough, then, another firm can enter the market because it, too,
will be able to get the efficiencies of scale.134 Also, in some industries there are natural
monopolies, but the effect of high prices spurs technological change, which creates
competition.135 Actual natural monopolies are rare, and situations in which the picture is
as simple as this are almost non-existent, because natural monopolies usually involve the
production of more than one type of good.136 For instance, selling electricity
transmission includes the provision of two services, putting wires into houses – which is,
because of the huge necessary capital outlay, almost a pure natural monopoly – and
generating electricity, which is almost certainly not.137
This problem has been explored for decades and a number of alternatives have
been proposed.138 The most generally accepted model of natural monopoly regulation
includes a restriction on anti-trust actions against the firm in return for some type of
complex pricing restriction.139 Various models that create efficient or near-efficient
outcomes have been proposed, but remain subject to the realization that the cost of
imposing them, in the direct and indirect costs of creating a regulatory apparatus, creates
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inefficiencies.140 On top of this, efforts are made to split off markets that are actually
competitive from those that are natural monopolies (e.g. allowing competition in long
distance telephony while regulating the firms that own the lines that actually enter
people’s homes).141 This combination allows competition where it is efficient to have
more than one firm, but permits society to gain from the diminishing average cost of
production without suffering from monopoly pricing where it is not.
The question, then, should be, to what extent is this metaphor useful for
understanding elections. To answer this question affirmatively, we need to identify what
the relevant equivalent to declining average cost, or, in other words, why is it efficient
(rather than merely likely) to have only two parties in our electoral system. The answer
is rather simple; in a single district/FPTP system, having only two parties increases the
likelihood that there will be a candidate selected by a majority rather than a plurality of
the voters. This increases the likelihood that policies represent the interests of the
electorate. For instance, a 60% right-center majority cannot lose an election in a twoparty system as the result of that vote being divided between two parties while the
opposition is united. As such, the likelihood of majority election can serve as a way to
judge electoral natural duopoly in the way declining average cost does in an economic
natural monopoly, since both reveal the extent of gains from not having multiple entrants.
Moreover, as discussed above, majority elections in a two-party system have
other benefits. They confer legitimacy on the winner (who has received the support of
more than half the population) and allow (and force) all voters to make an analytically
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simpler choice between two rather than many candidates.142 These are exactly the values
Schumpeter detailed as necessary for democracy in a mass society.
Therefore, rules that serve to promote a two-party system are good and not bad.
Issacharoff and Pildes understand this to a point, but back off when confronted with the
implications of the argument. They acknowledge the likelihood of two-party government
and argue that rules, like districted FPTP elections, that “incidentally” benefit a two-party
system are acceptable. They reject, though, those rules that explicitly favor a two-party
system.143 There are good reasons to avoid rules that help the current two parties: None
of the benefits of a two-party system are dependent on the parties being known as
“Democrats” and “Republicans” and, if the organizations of either of those parties ceases
to be responsive to voter concerns, there is no particular reason why one of them should
not be replaced. However, rules that entrench the existence of a two-party system are,
according to this model, beneficial. Moreover, there is nothing about the benefits
created here that are incompatible with the two-party system consisting of the two parties
we have now. So rules that help entrench the two-party system are fine so long as they
are not directed at ensuring that one of the existing parties is able to survive without
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being responsive to voter needs and desires.144 This natural duopoly understanding of
constitutional oversight of electoral regulation, as will be seen below, closely tracks
current Supreme Court doctrine.
That problem resolved, the question becomes how to ideally ensure effective
“pricing” in an electoral natural duopoly. Most of the strategies used in natural
monopoly situations would not make much sense in an electoral situation, and those that
do have little to do with the regulation of party primaries. However, the very fact that it
is a duopoly and not a monopoly will result in competition between the parties.
Duopolies generally create either a perfectly optimal market or a market that is suboptimal but still better than a monopoly, depending on your assumptions about the ways
firms interact.145 For this to work, though, the parties have to be distinct from and
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actually compete with one another. The latter is not really a part of the regulation of
primary elections – the debates over political gerrymandering and campaign finance are
more relevant for this discussion– but the former is exactly the rule set out in Jones.
Retaining distinct parties is necessary not only to ensure that parties issue representative
policies (because competition has, as a pre-condition, an assumption that each market
player can freely devise policy), but also to ensure that the system retains for the citizenry
the ability to replace a government they do not like with something different, a central
goal of a competitive democracy model.
Finally, the third piece of natural monopoly regulation is to separate off
competitive markets. Deregulation in telephony and electricity has in some situations
accomplished this by creating competitive markets in long distance phone calls and
electricity generation, creating a more efficient overall industry. Similarly, in order to
reach the goal of policies that are representative of the interests of voters, members of
that political party should be able to vote in primary elections free from restrictive rules
about who can appear on the ballot imposed by a party’s organization. The reason free
primaries promote representative general election is that members of the party only
interest is in choosing the most competitive candidate. Party officials, on the other hand,
have strong incentives for inside dealing (i.e. for party officials trying to favor other
active members of the party organization, rather than the most competitive candidate)
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (5th ed. 1946); Heinrich Von Stackelberg, MARKTFORM UND
GLEICHGEWICHT (Wien & Berlin 1934); Wassily Leontief, Stackelberg on Monopolistic Competition, J.
Pol. Econ. Aug. 1936, at 554, 554-559; J. Bertrand, Book Review, 67 Jour. Des Savants 499
(1883)(reviewing THEORIE MATHEMATIQUE DE LA RICHESSE SOCIALE and RECHERCHES SUR LES
PRINCIPES MATHEMATIQUES DE LA THEORIE DES RICHESSES)).
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because it increases the value of being a party member. Moreover, people who invest
time and energy into running parties are generally more radical politically and the may
use party rules to promote candidates who are further from the mainstream.146 As such,
opening up the primary ballot to any party member is more likely to produce competitive
general election candidates than permitting the party organization to pass strict ballot
access rules, and, hence, to create policies that are responsive to the interests of the
electorate in toto.
This vision of election law requires a Supreme Court willing to strike down a
number of state statutes that do not conform to this idea of competition. However, since
current Supreme Court doctrine basically follows this line of reasoning, this model would
not require changes in doctrine. It would also not require the Court to be more activist
than Pildes and Issacharoff would want it to be -- it would just require the Court to
overrule different laws. The organizing principle behind the constitutional review of
electoral regulation would be efficient competition, given the imperfect nature of electoral
markets, rather than the simpler competitive model Pildes and Issacharoff propose.
Restrictions on efficient competition could be justified, though, if the rules served to
protect the two Schumpeterian constraints – clarity and decisiveness. However, with the
proper understanding of efficient competition, few laws or executive decisions will need
to be justified, because the factors that contribute to creating efficient competition also
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produce clear choices for voters and decisive results, specifically protecting the two-party
system and free competition between the parties.147

147

This is not to say the Schumpeterian constraints never bind. The example that shows how these work in

practice is the most famous election law case, Bush v. Gore. The Per Curiam decision found a violation of
one of the component parts of efficient competition, arguing that applying the “intent of the voter” standard
would result in unfair competition between the parties and that there was not time to create a fair, statewide
standard. 532 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). Moreover, the state had no compelling reason – no reason that
furthered the ends of clarity of choice or decisiveness of result – to recount the ballots. Just the opposite,
recounting the ballots would result in a less decisive result. See Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note _, at
187-212. This meant that the state could not justify damage to representation. The reasonableness of the
determination that the state could not fashion a fair standard in time notwithstanding, Bush v. Gore stands,
under this understanding, as a rather straightforward application of the test this paper argues is central to
election law.
It is in the concurring opinion, though, that we see the application of the Schumpeterian
constraints. The concurring opinion claimed that Article II gave the Court the power to overrule the state
court decision to have a recount. Bush, 532 U.S. at 112. If, for a moment, we ignore the federalism
problems of this interpretation and accept that Article II gives the Supreme Court the right to review state
court interpretations of state election law regarding Presidential elections, the concurrence becomes an
application of the Schumpeterian constraints. The Florida Supreme Court had argued that “the need for
prompt resolution and finality is especially critical in presidential elections where there is an outside
deadline established by federal law. Notwithstanding, consistent with the legislative mandate and our
precedent, although the time constraints are limited, we must do everything required by law to ensure that
legal votes that have not been counted are included in the final election result.” Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1243, 1261 (Fla. 2000). In the framework of this paper, this is effectively a statement that efficient
competition would have been harmed (because the results of that competition would not be known) by not
counting the votes, even if doing so did not promote finality. The concurrence argued that the state
legislative rule, which put certification in the hands of local canvassing boards and the Secretary of State,

58

III. Current Law: Two Legs of a Tripod
The case law regulating political parties is notoriously complex, under-theorized
and internally contradictory in its rhetoric. One way of looking at this mishmash is
through the lens of natural monopoly regulation. It is not necessary to believe that courts
consciously had this paradigm in mind to believe that existing doctrine accommodates
state policy that fits within this idea of how elections should operate (and looks askance
at policy that does not). The “natural duopoly” theory would require the constitutional
review of election law to consist of three major components – a lack of regulation of state
efforts to permit the retention of the market power of political parties, active regulation of
their “pricing,” and an effort to segment downstream markets from the market suffering
from the natural monopoly problem. As will be seen below, the first two parts of this are
clearly visible in Supreme Court doctrine while the third leg is still up in the air. That leg
consists of a variety of lower court and indirectly applicable Supreme Court opinions
about restrictions laid down by states or by political parties on access primary ballots to
candidates who are certainly members of that political party.
Moreover, in each of the cases discussed below, the test employed by the
Supreme Court to test electoral regulations will represent an effort to balance two
should be enforced and that the state court should not have overruled their decisions. Id. at 122. This is an
implicit claim that the state was justified in limiting the counting of fair votes. It effectively upended the
logic of the Florida Supreme Court and held that “the need for prompt resolution and finality in Presidential
elections” did justify limiting fair representation. The concurrence is hence saying that the state legislature
had the right (and did) to limit the representativeness of government in order to produce more decisive
elections.
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competing visions about the value of electoral competition: representation and
Schumpeterian decisiveness and clarity. Though the steps sometimes merge, the rights
the Supreme Court has recognized are necessary to maximize representativeness in a
FPTP system, specifically free decision-making inside parties, but not the right to
interfere in the decision-making of other parties (the three legs of the tripod). The
interests the Supreme Court has found to be compelling enough to infringe on these rights
are those that promote clarity and decisiveness, the two values essential to the
Schumpeterian model of democracy.
A. The First Leg: Ignoring Market Power
The key insight of natural monopoly theory is that, under certain circumstances, it
is more efficient to have only one firm producing a certain good because certain markets
exhibit a diminishing marginal cost of production.148 The resulting regulation seeks to
take advantage of these economies of scale while avoiding the problems associated with
monopoly control. If the American electoral system is a “natural duopoly,” then
constitutional review of electoral regulation of parties should permit rules that favor the
existence of a two-party system, but not those rules that create extensive protection of the
existing two parties.
Courts following this paradigm would view the entrenchment of a two-party
system as a reasonable, even laudable, goal of state regulation. After years of accepting
in theory but being suspicious in practice of this type of policy,149 the Supreme Court
148
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established the principle that states could privilege a two-party system in their regulation
of primaries in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.150
Timmons involved a Minnesota state law that said no candidate could appear on
the general election ballot as the candidate of more than one party. While technically this
is a general election regulation, it is actually a regulation of primaries in that it restricts
the choice-set of parties to those candidates not endorsed by any other. “Fusion” of this
type has been a classic strategy for third parties to influence the political system, because
it allows third parties to gain a toehold in certain elections while running their own
candidates in others.151 The New Party – a small left-leaning party -- challenged
Minnesota’s law on the grounds that it restricted their First Amendment right
associational rights.152
The Court rejected this claim, arguing that, while the First Amendment protects
decisions by political parties about their own internal structure and activities, states can
and must regulate primary elections.153 The test to see whethera particular regulation is
150
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unconstitutional is straight-forward: “[W]e weigh the character and magnitude of the
burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends
justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden
necessary.”154 If a burden is severe, the regulation must be narrowly tailored and advance
a compelling state interest. States are, unsurprisingly, given more leeway when imposing
less substantial burdens.155
The Court found that the burden placed on the New Party was not severe. The
provisions only slightly reduced the number of people that the party could chose as their
standard-bearer and barely limited the party’s ability to communicate to the general
population who was its most favored candidate.156 “Many features of our political
system--e.g., single-member districts, "first past the post" elections, and the high costs of
campaigning--make it difficult for third parties to succeed in American politics.”157
Because the restriction imposed no direct limit on the Party’s ability to organize or
develop, it was not a severe limitation of the Party’s First and Fourteenth Amendment
associational rights.158
Minnesota provided a number of justifications for this limited restriction. Among
these was an interest in political stability. The Court said that, while “this interest does
not permit a State to completely insulate the two-party system from…competition and
influence,” it does permit it “to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in
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practice, favor the traditional two-party system.”159 As such, a state statute banning
fusion was not unconstitutional.
This is consistent with the ideas of optimal natural monopoly regulation. A
natural monopoly regulator would not “completely insulate” a monopolist by, say,
banning the development of new technology that could change the market into a normally
competitive one. It would however actively regulate the market and, by doing so, favor
the natural monopolist over potential competition. The Court’s reasoning in Timmons,
then, permits a natural monopoly style regulation of elections.
Applying this concept to fusion is not analytically simple. After all, fusion
initially increases the chances of a majority victor, because votes for third parties can
accrue to one of the top two candidates. However, its overall effect might aid third
parties, which will lead to more plurality elections down the road.160 Doing so might lead
to a less representative electoral scheme – though it also may not because the availability
of fusion will help ensure more majority elections when there are third parties. The
determination of whether permitting fusion is more likely to produce representative
results than banning it is a difficult question and it is therefore reasonable that state
legislatures can and should make decisions about it. Analytically, it is similar in this
respect to run-off elections; run-offs promote majority winners but also promote third
parties. Run-off elections are not constitutionally mandated, nor are they barred, and it is
a reasonable result to allow states the same discretion in making policy about fusion.
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The Court allowed Minnesota to favor a two-party system at two points in its
analysis. First, it defined the right to association in such a way that the ability to choose a
candidate who was the candidate of a major-party candidate was not protected by the
First Amendment and the fusion ban’s limit on a third party’s ability to express
information to its voters only the most minor of infringements on First Amendment
association rights. 161 A model based on ordinary antitrust principles would have viewed
this as a major limitation on the right to compete. Thus, the way the Court defines rights
is consistent with natural duopoly regulation.
The second way the Court favored the two-party system was to permit it to serve
as a justification for a state’s decision to limit associational rights. The reasons
Minnesota gave and the Court accepted for permitting the state to ban fusion were
straight out of Schumpeter: “avoiding voter confusion and overcrowded ballots,
preventing party-splintering and disruptions of the two-party system, and being able to
clearly identify the election winner”162
In Timmons, the Court held promoting the Schumpeterian values of clarity of
choice and decisiveness of result are justifiable state interests. The Court’s analysis then
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represents a balancing of the values of representation and the Schumpeterian model of
democracy. While it ultimately rested on a determination that the state’s interest in
stability was more important than the limited way in which it burdened representation,
the Court’s doctrine narrowed the scope of judicial discretion to a few variables on which
factual evidence could be marshaled and by which the Court could come to a reasoned,
principled decision.
The Court’s decision in Timmons has been criticized by most commentators,
including Issacharoff and Pildes.163 The harshest of these critics has been Rick Hasen.
Hasen attacks the value of the two-party system, but the central part of his argument is
that because of Duverger’s Law, the two-party system needs no protection by state
law.164
This argument is flawed. He correctly notes that, because of Duverger’s Law, a
third party is unlikely to make a major impact in American political life. But this ignores
the reasons why a two-party system is seen as a positive; it mistakes means for ends.
Arguments in favor of a two-party system rely on the fact that is provides clear choices
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for voters and decisive results (the two Schumpeterian values) and creates majority
winners (promote election results as representative as possible under the condition of
FPTP). A two-party system with somewhat viable third parties – something that
prohibiting states from creating rules like fusion bans would make more likely – achieves
none of these ends. Voters would face more complicated decisions and it would be
possible for a majority to lose elections because it is divided between two candidates,
which would be less decisive (because the losing majority would be disaffected with the
result) and less representative (because the majority would have lost). Thus, creating
rules that favor a two-party system is necessary to achieve the benefits of a two-party
system even if two parties would continue to dominate elections even in their absence.
The Court was right to recognize that promoting a two-party system is a compelling
justification for state policy.
The Second Leg: Competition and Distinctness as a Pricing Mechanism
In order for society to gain from having only one producer in a natural monopoly
setting without losing from a monopolist exploiting its market power, there need to be
regulations on the prices that the (natural) monopolist can charge.165 A variety of
different schemes have been proposed, but, since electoral markets are a natural duopoly,
one available way to get the “firms” to limit their prices is to make sure they compete
with each other. While much of the policy about this is made in realms other than
political party primaries (e.g., campaign financing, redistricting), one piece of regulation
in this area is necessary in order to have this price-limiting competition: distinct parties.
For political parties to be able to use their policy mixes to appeal to voters, they must be
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able to freely define those policies. This entails the ability to define their membership. If
decision-making about standard-bearers is made at the primary level, the party must be
able to define who is a member, so that interlopers cannot interfere with its decisions.
This way the parties are able to independently come up with a set of candidates and
policies that appeal to voters.
In California Democratic Party v. Jones, the Supreme Court established just this
principle, that the party organization can define who can be a member of the party.166 In
order to understand Jones, it is necessary to briefly go over the case law surrounding state
laws (or judicial interpretations of Constitutional rights) that sought to define party
membership. The modern age of party primary regulation started with the White Primary
Cases, in which the Supreme Court struck down a number of different barriers to the
participation of African-Americans in Democratic primaries in one-party states.167
Nathaniel Persily summarized these cases thusly:
Alongside poll taxes, grandfather clauses, literacy tests, and other more violent
and coercive tactics of disenfranchisement, white primaries were used by
Southern states and the Democratic Party and its subdivisions to prevent African
Americans from voting in what turned out to be the critical and determinative
election in those one-party states. Between 1927 and 1953, the Court overruled
its previous precedents and struck down a state statute that forbade the
participation of African Americans in the Democratic primary, and a statute that
delegated to the party executive committee the power to determine qualifications
166
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to vote in a party primary which it then exercised to ban African Americans
from the primary. Moreover…the Court struck down the Democratic Party's
practice (not mandated by state law) of excluding African Americans from
primaries. The Court held that "the recognition of the place of the primary in the
electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix
the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may
make the party's action the action of the State." Considering the primary in this
way, the Court interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment as preventing a state from
"casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to
practice racial discrimination in the election." Then, in a highly fractured
decision in the last of the White Primary Cases, Terry v. Adams, the Court
extended this reasoning even to the conduct of a party's unofficial subdivision or
alter ego, whose candidate selection mechanism effectively determined the
Democratic nominee that appeared on the ballot.168

The crucial question in all of these cases became state action or, rather, determining when
policy, created by the direct action of the state legislature, by political party rules
propagated by the party organization or by some subset of the party organization, is
subject to the restriction of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court, in these
cases and others, developed a three-part test for state action. “As a general rule, state
action will not be found unless: (1) the actor is an agent of the government; (2) the actor
performs a function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State;" or (3) the
government "jointly participates" with the private actor.”169 Political parties, at least
when controlling party primaries, meet all three of these conditions and do so rather
easily.170 While these cases made clear that parties were state actors when conducting
primaries, they did not resolve the question of whether political parties retained any First
Amendment right to exclude people from their primaries.
168
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Until Jones, this question was not clearly answered. This is not to say the Court
did not encounter these issues. The two most relevant of these cases were Democratic
Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette171 and Tashijan v. Republican Party.172 In La
Follete, the Court upheld a national party rule that excluded delegates to the Presidential
nominating convention selected by a state mandated “open primary” process (a primary
in which any voter, regardless of party, could participate).173 In Tashijan, the Court stuck
down a state law that prevented the Republican Party of Connecticut from including
independents in its primary.174 In these cases, the Court embraced the concept that
parties bear meaningful associational rights, even when conducting primaries. At the
same time, though, the Court was developing a contrary strain of jurisprudence. In
Rosario v. Rockefeller, the Court upheld a state law declaring that person must enroll in a
political party at least 30 days before the November general election in order to be
eligible to vote in the party's primary election held during the following year.175 The
Court found that a state interest in maintaining orderly elections and in the stability of
171
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party structures justified the limitations on the rights of voters. Though internal party
rules were not in question in the case, Rosario made the constitutionality of a party rule
permitting quick party switching seem dubious. The extent to which a political party’s
power could determine its own rules about party membership when faced with
constitutional challenges or contrary state law was not certain.
The Jones case was a response to Proposition 198, a statewide initiative passed in
1996. The voters of California changed their system for selecting candidates from a
“closed primary,” in which only registered party members could participate, to a “blanket
primary” system, which allows any voter to vote for any candidate in any primary in
same electoral cycle.176 Blanket primaries are supposed to promote moderate candidates
because they dilute the power of core partisans. A majority of the members of all parties
voted for the law, which passed with overwhelming support.177 The California
Democratic, Republican, Libertarian and Peace and Freedom parties, however, all had
internal rules barring non-members from participating in their primaries.178 They
challenged the state law as violating the First Amendment “right not to associate.”
Overruling a Ninth Circuit decision in favor of the state,179 the Supreme Court
invalidated the law.180 The Court first distinguished the blanket primary from the rules in
question in the White Primary Cases. Those cases dealt with political parties that, in their
capacity as state actors, developed rules that violated an “independent constitutional
176
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proscription.”181 This case was distinguishable because it dealt with the question of
whether an otherwise constitutional party rule mandating a closed primary could be
removed by state laws.
The Court did not deny that party rules were state action, but stated that “when
States regulate parties' internal processes. they must act within limits imposed by the
Constitution.” 182 One of those restrictions was the right to freedom of association
possessed by political parties, as represented by the party organization. “[T]he
constitutional rights of those composing the party cannot be disregarded.”183 While the
Court noted that “an election, unlike a convention or caucus, is a public affair,” it argued
that “when the election determines a party's nominee it is a party affair as well, and …
the constitutional rights of those composing the party cannot be disregarded.”184
This associational right included the right to exclude people from the party.
Ruling otherwise without overruling Tashijan, the Court argued, would lead to
“nonsensical” results. Tashijan stated that political parties had the constitutional right to
permit independents to vote in their primaries. Failing to acknowledge a correlative right
to exclude would mean that “[t]he First Amendment would thus guarantee a party's right
to lose its identity, but not to preserve it.”185
The Court, though, overstated the holding of Tashijan, which merely permitted
the Republican Party to include independents in its primary, not members of another
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party. This avoided the potential for conflict between the holdings in Tashijan and
Rosario. The Court in Tashijan noted but did not resolve this question. Footnote 13 of
the opinion stated, “Our holding today does not establish that state regulation of primary
voting qualifications may never withstand challenge by a political party or its
membership. A party seeking…to open its primary to all voters, including members of
other parties, would… threaten other parties with the disorganization effects which the
statute in [Rosario was] designed to prevent.”186 Jones glides over this problem, leaving
it as a potential exception to the general holding affirming party autonomy in determining
membership lists.
The Court’s strong defense of the right of parties to exclude made Proposition 198
unconstitutional. The Court noted that “[t]he record also supports the obvious
proposition that these substantial numbers of voters who help select the nominees of
parties they have chosen not to join often have policy views that diverge from those of
the party faithful.”187 Because of this and because the selection of candidates is crucial to
party identity, the burden placed on parties by the blanket primary was grave enough to
justify strict scrutiny.188 The interest of the state in promoting moderate candidates was
not sufficient because the state simply could not force private parties – or political parties
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– to change their political message.189 Proposition 198 was found unconstitutional
because it was intended to do just that.
This vision of parties with powerful rights to define their own membership fits the
natural duopoly model of electoral regulation. This ability is necessary for parties to be
able to freely compose a set of policies that can be used to compete for voters, which
serves as a check on the “pricing” power the two-parties have as a result of Durverger’s
Law. The Court defined the right of association, then, in line with the concept of natural
duopoly regulation.
It should be considered why the state’s interests did not justify impinging on those
associational rights. In Timmons, the Court was clear that policies that harmed the right
to association could be justified if they improved the clarity of decisions for voters, the
two-party system or the decisiveness of elections.190 In Jones, the Court rejected that
other justifications, like the fact that blanket primaries would produce more moderate
candidates, could ever justify burdening the right to association. Moreover, California
could not have relied on the Schumpeterian justifications in Jones; the blanket primary
law reduced rather than enhanced the clarity of choices that general election voters face.
Less distinct parties mean that voters are less able to use party identification as a cue
meaning someone different than the incumbent. Blanket primaries were designed to
create less distinct parties – it allows members of one party to vote in the primary of
another. Though this is impossible to prove (because it requires proving a negative),
189

See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)

(holding that the City of Boston could not force a parade organizer opposed to homosexual lifestyles to
permit gays and lesbians to participate in their parade though its public accommodations law).
190

See notes __ and accompanying text.

73

these two cases make it seem that the only justifications the Court will accept as reasons
for limiting associational rights are those that promote Schumpeterian values.
A number of lower court cases have fleshed out the broad discretion that political
parties have to define their own membership. The right for parties to ideologically selfdefine has not only served as a reason for finding that a state law impermissibly abridges
a party’s First Amendment rights, but has also served as a compelling state interest to
justify a law that preserves that autonomy against a claim by a candidate that he had a
right to appear on a primary ballot. David Duke’s repeated efforts to run for President as
a Republican and the efforts of the Georgia Republican Party to keep him off the ballot
lead to extensive litigation that culminated in Duke v. Massey.191 In that case, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the state law that gave a committee selected by the Republican
Party the right to determine who was a candidate for President was state action, but that it
was constitutional because of a compelling state interest in political parties being able to
define their own identity and because it was narrowly tailored to advance that interest.192
Moreover, internal party rules excluding Duke as a member of the party were
constitutional even though the party was a state actor when running its primary. The
court made the clearest declaration of this right on record: “The Republican Party has a
First Amendment right to freedom of association and an attendant right to identify those
who constitute the party based on political beliefs.”193
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It should be noted that this is substantively different than state party restrictions
dealing with whom, among members of a party, can appear on a primary ballot. The
Georgia Republican Party argued that Duke’s racist ideology disqualified him from being
a member, not a candidate, of the party. This rule creates a problem, however. Given that
it is relatively easy to become a member of a party and parties do not review the
membership rolls for ideological, an ideological test that is solely in the hands of the state
party leadership could become a way for the party organization to simply eliminate from
the party any candidate that the organization did not like. Nathaniel Persily offers a
clever solution to this problem: courts should only accept party organization limitations
on membership that are based on “criteria for candidacy well before the primary
campaign begins”194 Doing so would avoid the possibility that party leaders could use
their right to ideologically define themselves to create impervious barriers to challenging
their favored candidates.195
Jones also helps explain Timmons. One way for parties to define themselves, and
to separate themselves from other parties, would be to enact an internal rule saying that
no one who is the candidate of another party can receive their endorsement. The holding
in Jones would force courts to overrule any state law that tried to overrule this internal
rule. Fusion, then, can be banned either by the state (Timmons) or by a political party
194
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(Jones). Hence, the Supreme Court has not just ruled that a rule against fusion is
tolerable state policy, but rather that Constitutional oversight of political parties permits
either the major parties acting in their own interest or the state, acting in the interest of a
two-party system, to reject fusion.196
While Jones and the related case law deals with the right of political parties to
define their membership, the question of its potential conflict with Rosario was left open.
The Supreme Court has simply left open the question it posed in footnote 13 of the
Tashijan opinion, whether state regulation that limited a “party seeking…to open its
primary to all voters, including members of other parties, would… threaten other parties
with the disorganization effects which the statute in [Rosario was] designed to
prevent.”197 While Tashijan clearly limits the rights of states to paternalistically tell
parties what is best for them, states do potentially maintain a compelling interest in
distinct political parties.
Two circuit courts have dealt with this issue. In Cool Moose Party v. Rhode
Island, the First Circuit found for the political party, but only because the state failed to
make the relevant argument.198 The Tenth Circuit, though, in Beaver v. Clingman
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addressed the question directly but found that the state had not shown any factual basis
that allowing members of other parties to vote in a Libertarian Party primary would harm
political stability. 199
This model calls for the contrary result; a state’s interest in maintaining distinct
political parties should be considered compelling. Distinct political parties create free
competition between the parties, and hence promote both representative election and the
Schumpeterian ends of clear choices for voters and decisive electoral results. A state’s
embrace of this vision of political stability – created by competition from distinct
political parties – was considered a compelling interest in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Timmons, allowing the state to limit the otherwise sacrosanct ability of a political party
to choose its candidate freely. If state laws can limit the ability of a party to choose as
their nominee the candidate of another party, it stands to reason that they can limit the
ability of political parties to choose as the membership members of other parties.
The natural duopoly argument would also point to accepting this as a compelling
state interest. Jones and Tashijan support two values essential to the model – giving
parties the ability to freely choose their political message and ensuring that the two major
parties remain distinct from one another. A decision by one political party to allow
members of other parties to vote in its primary would undermine both of these values. In
order for competition to serve as a constraint on the advantages of the two major parties,

also other parties or the party system generally. Curiously, however, the State failed to make such an
argument … on appeal.”).
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they cannot collude and having all voters participate in one party’s primary would
constitute collusion.200
Subject to this proviso, though, the case law on a party’s ability to define its
membership fits within the natural duopoly model of electoral regulation.
C. The Missing Third Leg: Downstream Competition
Even where natural monopolies can be perfectly regulated, the problem still
produces a less than optimal market, if for no other reason than the heavy cost of
monitoring the natural monopolist’s behavior.201 In a situation like the natural duopoly in
electoral markets, even the best possible regulations will, most likely, leave significant
distortions. Hence separating those markets that do have natural monopoly (or natural
duopoly) characteristics from those that do not is generally considered good policy (e.g.
separating electricity generation from electricity distribution). The reason given above for
considering the natural duopoly of electoral markets akin to natural monopolies in other
markets – that increasing the likelihood of majority elections is like the efficiency gains
from increasing returns to scale in an economic market – does not apply to primary
elections. As such, it is sensible to make primary elections as free as possible to
candidates who are members of the party.
When faced with state laws regulating primaries, the Supreme Court has generally
been rather strict. When state laws have conflicted with the expressive associational
rights of members of a political party to appear on the primary ballot, the Court has
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looked at them askance except to the extent these laws are necessary to avoid confusion
on the ballot.202 However, it has never dealt directly with the more difficult question of
how to analyze party organization rules restricting who, among party members, can
appear on the ballot. As a result, courts faced with challenges by candidates to party
rules around the country have differed. If the natural monopoly model of electoral
regulation is to succeed, it is necessary for the Court to resolve this question by ruling
that party organization rules are subject to the same restrictions as state laws. Otherwise,
primary elections will not have the chance to operate as freely functioning markets
untainted by the natural duopoly problems of general elections.
The reason party rules dealing with primaries should be treated like state laws and
not given much deference has to do with the role of primaries in elections. In order to
explain this, though, it is necessary to discuss what we mean when we say “party.” V.O.
Key famously broke political parties down into three parts: “the party-in-the-electorate,”
(the general membership of the party), “the party-in-government,” (governmental
officials elected on the party ticket), and the “party organization,” (those individuals who
work for the party).203 When we discuss party rules restricting who can be on a primary
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ballot, we are talking about the ways in which the party organization creates rules to limit
the choices of the party-in-the-electorate. Similarly, when we discuss state laws limiting
access to primary ballots, we mean that the party-in-government (presuming the party has
power in government at the time) is restricting the choices of the party-in-the-electorate.
The first question in any such case would be whether a party rule or state law
restricts a right that would serve to make elected officials (and hence policy) more
representative of the preferences of the electorate given the restraints of FPTP elections.
The key is to look at which understanding of associational rights would result in a general
election that produced more representative outcomes. There is no compelling policy
reason that we should interpret the Constitution to protect the right of the “party,”
however defined, to have officials representative of their preferences except if it serves to
produce actual elected officials that are representative of the whole population.
These questions turn on motive. For state laws, it is easy to see that the party-ingovernment has little interest in creating primary rules that will produce the most
competitive general election candidates. If the party-in-government controls the
government, the incumbent officials will have a strong interest in protecting themselves
from primary challenges. If the party-in-government does not control the government,
allowing restrictive state rules to govern a primary would be tantamount to letting a
party’s major competitor set its rules, surely something that is not likely to produce
strong general election candidates. Both the party-in-electorate and the party
organization have stronger interests in producing competitive party candidates. Free

party organization is often composed of elected officials. That said, as analytic categories, they have
proved remarkably useful and they will be treated as functionally separate for the purposes of this paper.
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primaries, rather than those impeded by restrictive state laws, are hence more likely to
produce competitive general election candidates. Having competitive general election
candidates from both parties is a condition necessary for competition between the parties
to result in representative elected officials. Hence, the Supreme Court’s suspicion of
state laws that interfere with the ability of candidates to get on primary ballots makes
sense inside the general framework laid out in this paper.
Making determinations about rules created by the party organization is more
difficult. They, unlike elected officials, have an interest in having the strongest possible
candidate come out of the primary for the simple reason that winning election enhances
their power and influence. However, most people willing to devote time and energy to
party organizations are not much like the party as a whole – they are generally speaking
more ideologically-driven and radical than their counterparts among the party
electorate.204 They also generally have relationships with elected officials (or want to be
elected officials themselves) and have incentives to promote their friends rather than the
best candidates. As a result of these ideological and personal commitments, rules
promoted by the party organization will, on average, produce less competitive candidates
than those chosen by party electorate. If we assume that party members share some
ideological similarity, created through the party’s ability to ideologically self-define, it
seems safe to argue that primary voters will vote for the candidate they think is most
likely to win, especially given the generally more committed and interested electorate
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that shows up for primary elections. As such, primaries free from party rules are more
likely to promote competitive general election candidates
Because of the competing motives of party officials, this difference may not be
large, making the state interest in protecting the associational rights of party members to
participate in primaries freed from restrictive party rules a relatively weak one. Even so,
a state would have to have an interest in overriding even weak associational interests.205
None exists in this context. According to the model created in this paper, one that is
consistent with both the reasoning and holding of the entirety of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in this field, the only interests that can be used to justify limiting
associational rights are those that create general elections with clear choices for voters
and clear, decisive results. Party rules that restrict ballot access in primaries cannot be
said to promote either of these ends – no matter what form the primary takes, the party
will still only elect one candidate, leaving the general election with only two major party
representatives, leaving the general electorate with a clear choice between two different
candidates. That the candidates will be different from one another is ensured by the rules
allowing the party (notably the party organization) to ideologically self-define. Further,
as long as there are only two candidates from the two major parties, there is no reason to
think that the identity of the candidate will affect the decisiveness of the election.
Thus understood, there should be a right to participate in free primary elections
and simply no reason to allow a party organization to create significant hurdles to the
primary ballot beyond those necessary for an orderly election.
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The current law tracks this understanding to a point. The Supreme Court has
developed relatively clear rules about how to deal with state laws that limit primary ballot
access – they closely track, but are not identical to, the way courts treat laws about
general elections. For instance, Gray v. Sanders involved a state law (and a party rule)
that gave rural areas more votes in primaries.206 The Court rejected this as violating the
one-person-one-vote rule and stated the Equal Protection clause applied because this
constituted state action.207 No mention was made of the independent interests of the
party or the state interest in providing political parties with autonomy to make their own
decisions.
Two later cases continued this tactic of determining that state laws controlling
party primaries were state laws like any other and then judging them by the standards
developed for general elections. In Bullock v. Carter and Lubin v. Panish, the Court held
that high filing fees for primary candidates violated the Equal Protection Clause. 208
Because the laws affected candidates, and not voters directly, they were not subject to
strict scrutiny, but because restrictions on candidates affect voters indirectly, the standard
applied was that “the laws must be closely scrutinized and found reasonably necessary to
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the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional
muster.”209 In neither case did the state meet this burden. While the proffered reason of
“keeping its ballots within manageable, understandable limits is of the highest order,” it
was not enough to justify the filing fees.210 Courts have, following Bullock and Lubin,
applied this general election test to state laws regulating primary elections.
Applying the general election test to state primary laws is not the same thing as
treating them in the same fashion. General elections feature candidates selected by
parties, thus limiting who is on the ballot. States and courts regulate party behavior,
which in turn effects who is on the general election ballot. Thus, even if the same
standard is used to judge laws determining what it takes for a party member to get on the
primary ballot as are used to judge the laws determining how independents can get on the
general election ballot, the regulation of primary and general elections remains very
different.
Determining what is a severe restriction on candidates or voters and, if a
restriction is severe, what justifications can be compelling are complicated questions.
While there are a variety of general election rules that raise these issues, the most
common in primary elections are rules that require candidates to get a certain number and
type of signatures to get on to the primary ballot.211 These cases turn out to require
209
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extensive factual inquiry based on how restrictive the requirement actually is. The most
famous of these cases was Rockefeller v. Powers, which involved a challenge to the
complex New York presidential primary laws by Steve Forbes in 1996.212 After an
extensive factual analysis to determine the extent of the restriction, the court held the
state law unconstitutional.213 In doing so, it made clear that only justifications that could
be used at the general election level – like avoiding ballot confusion -- would work for
primaries.214

One scholar noted that “[the] court rejected almost out of hand any party

interest in filtering out its disfavored candidates, let alone a state interest in giving the
party the right to define its own membership.”215
The case law surrounding 1996 New York Republican Presidential Primary
showed that state laws that limited access to primary ballots are judged by the same
standard used in general elections. The 2000 New York primary opened the door to
discussing how to treat party rules that are merely enforced by the state. After the state
law that permitted the convoluted primary system was struck down in 1996, the state
passed a law allowing major political parties to choose one of two possible ways for
candidates to get their delegates on the presidential primary ballot.216 Clearly designed to
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allow each party to continue its favored system, the law permitted the Republican Party,
as an internal decision, to choose a system that continued the high signature requirements
eliminated from state law in the 1996 election. Supporters of John McCain filed a claim,
“related” to the 1996 litigation, arguing that the rules were still unconstitutional.217 In
Molinari v. Powers, a federal district court, after determining that each of the other
proffered reasons for the strict rules on ballot access were clearly insufficient, noted that
the “only present comprehensible purpose of the [policy] is to disadvantage a candidate
for President who does not enjoy the support of the Republican State Committee.”218
Because the Supreme Court stated that “that the particular interests of the major parties
cannot automatically be characterized as legitimate state interests,” the court found that
interests of the Republican Party organization did not justify the restriction.219 The policy
limited the rights of voters and candidates and was not justified by a legitimate state
interest, making it unconstitutional.
This ruling, formally discussing a state law that permitted parties to make one of
two choices, leads to an obvious question – what happens when a party rule that is not
codified at all in state law (except to the extent the state enforces party rules) significantly
limits access to a primary ballot. Language in the Molinari decision seems to point to not
making a distinction between party rules and state laws. “While [this law/choice] may
further the interest of the Republican State Committee, as distinguished from the 3.1
million New York voters affiliated with the Republican Party, it undermines the very
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purpose of a primary, which is to protect the general party membership against this sort
of minority control by the party leadership.”220 This inclination is by no means universal,
however. Looking at how two different courts treated virtually identical party
organization primary ballot access restrictions makes this clear.
In two cases in the early 1980s, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
dealt with the constitutional status of a Democratic Party rule that required candidates for
office to get 15% support from the state party convention in order to get on the primary
ballot. The state tried to pass a law that allowed candidates to get on the ballot without
getting 15% support and the Governor asked the SJC for an advisory opinion on its
constitutionality. In Opinion of the Justices, the SJC ruled that the state could not
overrule the party rule because doing so would violate the Democratic Party’s First
Amendment right to freedom of association.221 The court argued that the state had an
interest in an orderly ballot, which allowed it to restrict the number of candidates on the
ballot, but did not have an interest in eliminating party rules which made the ballot more
orderly still (i.e. restricted access for candidates). Then, in Langone v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, the SJC ruled that state enforcement of the rule was constitutional
against a First Amendment challenge brought by individual candidates and voters.222
First, the court held that the party rule did not heavily burden the fundamental interests of
candidates and voters because candidates were still free to try and get the 15% support
and because they could run as independents.223 As such, the rule was only subject to
220
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rational basis review, and the court held that enforcing the rule was rationally related to
the legitimate interest the state had in maintaining the integrity of political parties.224
The interests of the state party organization were hence found to be state interests.
Recently, a federal district court in Connecticut faced nearly the same issue but
came to the opposite conclusion. In state-wide elections and elections in multi-town
districts, state law required that, for a candidate to force a primary, she had to have 15%
support from all the relevant town (and state) party committees.225 The Republican and
Democratic parties both had internal rules which seconded the state law, meaning that,
even if a court found the state law unconstitutional, it would still have to rule on the
question of whether the state could constitutionally enforce the party rules.226 In
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Campbell v. Bysiewicz, the court held that both the law and the enforcement of the party
rules were unconstitutional.227 The court found that the party rules imposed a heavy
burden on the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of candidates and their supporters.
The state argued that it had a compelling interest in maintaining the associational
freedom of the parties, but the court rejected this out of hand. “While the state may not
impair the right to associate, either of the party or individual voters, that prohibition …
does not insulate a party monopoly, particularly against insurgents within the party
seeking to carry its banner.”228 The court then spoke directly to the question of whether
parties had an independent right to make rules more restrictive of primary ballot access
than the state. “Even though party interests may differ from state interests, where parties
are deemed state actors they are not permitted to adopt rules found to be unconstitutional
when adopted by the state.”229 In doing so, the court issued a per se rule that party rules
regulating primary ballot access were subject to the exact same Constitutional scrutiny as
state law.
The approach in Campbell and Molinari is consistent with the natural duopoly
theory of electoral regulation because it effectively turns primary elections into free
markets separate from the natural duopoly constraint of general elections. The First
Amendment should protect the rights of voters to participate in primaries free from
restrictive party organization imposed rules because it at least weakly promotes more
unconstitutional and the state, rather than appealing, changed the law. See id; Campbell II, 242 F. Supp 2d
at 167.
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representative general elections.230 The state has no reason to impinge on these rights,
because doing so would not promote clear choices for voters in general elections or
decisive election results.
Nathaniel Persily, using a very different normative perspective, has come to a
very similar conclusion, but with two crucial differences.231 Rather than judging partyorganization-created primary ballot access rules by the same standard as state laws
regulating general election ballot access, he argues that they should be judged by a
sliding scale depending on how important the primary is as a barrier to winning the
general election (e.g. restrictive primary ballot access rules in one-party states should be
treated more harshly).232 Moreover, courts should consider party interests separately and
should, depending on the importance of the party interest, find those interests to be either
“legitimate” or “compelling” enough to justify restrictions on the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of candidates and voters. It is necessary to consider both of these
proposals in turn.
While it makes some kind of intuitive sense that elections in which one party is
dominant should be treated differently than those in competitive districts, it is hard to see
on closer inspection why party organizations in competitive areas should be able to close
off access to the primary ballot. If internal party competition is a good, then it should be
a good everywhere. Even if it is more important to have party competition in areas
dominated by one party, because it is the only way to influence politics there, it still is
230
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better to have competition in primaries than not to have it. These rules often flourish in
areas that are generally competitive in general elections. For instance, Campbell
overruled a primary ballot access rule in Connecticut, which has a great deal of interparty competition.
Also, Persily’s rule would create an adjudicative nightmare. While it is easy to
recognize a one-party state, like the Texas of the White Primary Cases, courts would have
to come up with a metric for determining when a district is competitive. The panoply of
choices – votes by party for President, votes in the particular race discussed, party
registration – bespeaks the difficulty of determining how competitive a district is. This is
especially problematic given the power of individual incumbents, which could skew the
results of any of these determinations. Also, courts would have to figure out how their
determination of competitiveness relates to the level of the harm and how compelling the
state’s (or the party’s) proffered interest is. Given the already confusing and inconsistent
nature of constitutional law surrounding elections, this rule hardly seems advisable.
Persily also argues that courts should consider the separate interests of parties as
possible justifications for restrictive primary ballot access rules. He notes that
determining which of these interests are constitutionally permissible will be a difficult
task. For instance, he rules out arguing that a restriction is justified by wanting to rule
out those candidates without much support because “the primary election, not the ballot
access requirement, serves as the principal means of estimating the candidate's
support.”233 The only interest Persily can devise that would justify restrictions is a desire
to have a primary election winner selected by the majority, rather than a plurality, of the
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party.234 This may be in the party’s interest (as defined by the party organization) but it is
not in the general interest. Permitting a policy that aids political party organizations
while harming the general public would be harmed hardly seems advisable.235
For these reasons, it is probably best to use same standard to judge state laws and
party rules regulating primary ballot access. Doing so, as part of the whole system of
constitutional oversight of electoral regulation proposed in this paper, would best
effectuate the ends of ensuring that officials are as representative of the preferences of
voters as possible inside the structural constraints of the natural duopoly caused by
Duverger’s Law and the normative constraints of maintaining party difference and
ensuring the legitimacy of elections.
IV: Conclusion: The Court Redeemed
It is easy for scholars to criticize the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on election
law as overly simplistic and under-theorized. After all, it surely is these things; the sheer
number of cases requiring Supreme Court review in this area is testament to the fact that
the current Constitutional jurisprudence in this area is unclear. The opinions themselves
seem all over the place in terms of their reliance on different theories of democracy.
However, the actual answers the Court has given in election law cases are consistent with
a sophisticated understanding of the effect of FPTP elections and competing ideas about
the value of competition in a democratic state. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Vieth, though,

234

Id. at 2225.

235

See JUST ELECTIONS, supra note 24, at 82 (“To determine what rights parties should have, we should

decide what ends they serve for citizens.”)

92

makes clear that at least one member of the Court understand the case law in these terms.
This paper, hopefully, has provided ballast for this understanding.
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